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THE SIOUX’S SUITS:  
GLOBAL LAW AND THE DAKOTA ACCESS 
PIPELINE 
 




The Sioux Tribe’s lawsuits and protests against the 
Dakota Access Pipelines (DAPL) received an incredible amount 
of international attention in ways that many Indigenous peoples’ 
protests have not. This article argues that attention exists 
because the Sioux Tribe has been at the epicenter of the 
Indigenous peoples’ rights movement in international law. 
Accordingly, they have invoked or claimed international human 
rights—particularly free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC)—
to complicate, and perhaps destabilize, the DAPL’s 
development. However, the importance of their activism is not 
merely in claiming human rights. 
Based upon a global map of law that involves multiple 
and overlapping legalities, this article tracks the Sioux Tribe’s 
activism according to the problem-solving approach. 
Accordingly, the Sioux Tribe is advancing a different model of 
legality, one that is not based on a top-down command and 
control authority. This article reveals a complex, global network 
of intercommunal Indigenous peoples and nonstate actors by 
tracing the historical trajectory of the Sioux Tribe, its opposition 
to the DAPL, its role in the Indigenous peoples’ rights 
movement, and the novel extra-national legalities the Sioux 







                                                
* Stephen Young is a sessional lecturer and PhD candidate in law at the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In mid-2016, the Sioux Tribe1 initiated legal suits and 
protests to prevent the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) from 
crossing under Lake Oahe,2 a reservoir on the Missouri River 
from which the Sioux Tribe sources its drinking water.3 The 
Sioux Tribe sought to protect its water source, but its protest 
aligns with broader goals, such as protecting lands, culture, 
sacred sites, the environment, and rectifying past injuries.4 
Crucially, as argued here, it also aligns with larger international 
and transnational movements. In opposing the DAPL, the Sioux 
Tribe claimed that the federal government failed to adequately 
consult them or obtain consent in contravention of federal law, 
treaties, and the international human rights of self-determination 
and free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC).5 
Although federal legal procedures may ultimately 
provide the Sioux Tribe with a means for preventing continued 
operation of the DAPL,6 which is currently functional, the Sioux 
Tribe’s invocation of FPIC at other levels of legality has been, 
to some degree, successful. It has been successful in further 
formalizing networks of Indigenous peoples, human rights 
advocates, nonstate, and transnational legal actors to defund and 
divest from fossil fuels.7 Undoubtedly, federal law remains a 
central component of Tribe-State relations.8 However, since the 
                                                
1 The terms “Standing Rock Sioux Tribe” and “Sioux” are not necessarily 
synonymous. Here, the term “Sioux Tribe” refers to those peoples of the 
Great Sioux Nation, including the Standing Rock, Cheyenne River, 
Yankton, and Crow Creek Sioux Tribes. The relation between law and tribal 
signifier is examined infra section II.AI.A–B. 
2 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, (Standing Rock 
I), 205 F. Supp. 3d 4 (D.D.C. 2016); Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, (Standing Rock II), 239 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 
2017); Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, (Standing 
Rock III), 255 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2017). 
3 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, Background on the Dakota Access Pipeline, at 
1, https://www.standingrock.org/data/upfiles/media/ 
Backgrounder%20DAPL%20SRST%20FINAL.pdf (webpage is no longer 
active) (on file with author) [hereinafter Background on the DAPL].  
4 Id. at 1 (“The Tribe opposes DAPL because we must honor our ancestors 
and protect our sacred sites and our precious waters.”). 
5 Steve Sitting Bear & Robert Borrero, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and IITC 
File an Urgent Communication to the United Nations Citing Human Rights 
Violations Resulting from Pipeline Construction, Aug. 19, 2016, 
http://hosted.verticalresponse.com/1383891/95e72ee8db/545546365/b5d5e1
da0f/ [https://perma.cc/X427-T3GQ]. 
6 See, e.g., Standing Rock III, supra note 2.  
7 Infra section V.F. 
8 Supra note 1. 
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early 1980s, Indigenous peoples have been developing extra-
national legal levels to pressure industry, nonstate actors, and 
states to adopt new ways of approaching Tribe-State 
interactions.9 The Sioux Tribe was at the center of this 
movement,10 and this role in advancing Indigenous peoples’ 
rights partly explains the Tribe’s ability to generate international 
attention. Appreciating the Sioux Tribe’s role in the Indigenous 
peoples’ rights movement in international law also assists in 
explaining why its opposition to the DAPL has been formative 
for Indigenous peoples around the world. From a legal 
perspective, it is important to appreciate how the Sioux Tribe, 
with the support of many others, has formed and relied upon 
extra-national and sub-national levels of legality to de-center the 
extant statist legal regime.11 
This article explains the Sioux Tribe’s opposition 
according to Patrick Cottrell and David Trubek’s problem-
solving approach to law in global spaces.12 Where most law 
operates as “top-down control using fixed statutes, detailed rules, 
and judicial enforcement,”13 Cottrell and Trubek explain that in 
global spaces, “law-like processes operate more as a framework 
for collective problem solving in complex and uncertain 
situations.”14 When peer pressure fails to persuade states and 
industry to participate in working towards resolving a common 
problem, those excluded from participating may engage in more 
destabilizing acts.15 The Sioux Tribe sought to participate in 
resolving a common problem: who to consult and who has the 
                                                
9 Infra section V.C–F. 
10 Infra section V.C. See, e.g., Int’l Indian Treaty Council, Declaration of 
Continuing Independence, June 1974, http://www.iitc.org/about-iitc/the-
declaration-of-continuing-independence-june-1974/. 
11 See BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON 
SENSE 246–47 (2002) (NEW COMMON SENSE). Santos writes, “the nation-
state has been the most central time-space of law for the last two hundred 
years, particularly in the core countries of the world system. However, its 
centrality only became possible because the other two time-spaces, the local 
and the global, were formally declared non-existent by the hegemonic 
liberal political theory.” Id. at 85. 
12 See generally M. Patrick Cottrell & David M. Trubek, Law as Problem 
Solving: Standards, Networks, Experimentation, and Deliberation in Global 
Space, 21 TRANS. L. & CONT. PROB. 359 (2012). 
13 David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal 
Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. 
EUR. L. 539, 543 (2006-2007). 
14 Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12, at 359. They say “law-like” because in 
many instances, the norms they are discuss are “soft-law” norms or non-top-
down, command and control style legalities. 
15 Id. at 374. 
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power to participate in permitting the construction of the DAPL 
on disputed territory.16 To the extent that federal and industry 
actors identified problems, they were problems of permitting 
solvable under federal law.17 In turning to federal law, the federal 
actors ignored or minimized the territorial dispute and therein 
disregarded the commonality of the problem by simply shifting 
the problem to the Sioux Tribe. As argued here, the Sioux 
Tribe’s exclusion from participating according to its own, or a 
negotiated, participatory standard has led it to use alternative 
tools to pressure federal and industry actors.18 The Sioux Tribe 
has done so by invoking international human rights law and 
cultivating international media attention in concert with 
transnational and inter-network legalities to oppose the DAPL. 
Its efforts may in time lead to destabilization of many fossil fuel 
developments.19 
Part Two orients the dispute in a historical context. As 
argued here, the peoples known today as the “Sioux Tribe” have 
organized against the DAPL as a result of its struggle against the 
federal government and the resulting dispossession due to 
natural resource exploitation. Importantly, this short history also 
establishes that the land the DAPL crosses is disputed—a dispute 
that federal and industry actors believe is either previously 
solved or solvable under federal law.  
Part Three then discusses state-level legality, the Sioux 
Tribe’s litigation in the federal courts, and the DAPL protest. 
The Sioux Tribe’s appeal to the legal system may, in time, halt 
further operation of the DAPL,20 but the Sioux Tribe’s use of 
legal procedures has limitations. According to federal law, the 
land is no longer disputed, so legal action cannot resolve the 
                                                
16 Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 18. 
17 Id. at 37 (“this Court does not lightly countenance any depredation of 
lands that hold significant to the Standing Rock Sioux. Aware of the 
indignities visited upon the Tribe over the last centuries, the Court 
scrutinizes the permitting process here with particular care. Having done so, 
the court must nonetheless conclude that the Tribe has not demonstrated that 
an injunction is warranted here.”). 
18 Kristen A Carpenter & Angela R Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the 
Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights, 102 CAL. L. REV. 173, 177 
(2014) (arguing that General Assembly’s endorsement of the UNDRIP is 
jurisgenerative moment for Indigenous peoples). 
19 See infra section I.F.2; Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12, 374.  
20 Standing Rock III, supra note 2; contra Presidential Memorandum 





underlying territorial dispute.21 Further, using federal law to 
settle the land dispute further subjects the Sioux Tribe to the 
federal legal regime.22 Despite these limitations, the Sioux Tribe 
must engage with the legal system to contest the DAPL 
development because it is the legal system under which the 
permits for the DAPL are issued. However, the Sioux Tribe’s use 
of multiple extra-national levels is important for revealing how 
federal law is inadequate, how the Sioux Tribe engages with the 
federal legal system as part of a global legal challenge, and how 
Indigenous peoples are formalizing a different style of legality. 
Part Four then introduces the concept of Indigenous 
peoples’ FPIC, which some commentators see as a “right of 
Indigenous Peoples to make free and informed decisions about 
proposed large-scale projects on or near their land.”23 The key 
instrument for Indigenous peoples’ rights is the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 
which contains several articles on FPIC.24 Generally, if states 
recognize FPIC, then states will seek tribal consent before taking 
actions that could impact tribal livelihood and territories. As 
such, it appears FPIC could provide Indigenous peoples with a 
means for preventing projects of which they do not approve, like 
the DAPL.25 Although FPIC may appear promising, settler-
states, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand, view UNDRIP as a nonbinding, aspirational 
instrument, and hence they view some rights it recognizes, like 
FPIC, as nonbinding.26 Another concern is that FPIC, as a 
                                                
21 See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 388 (1980) 
[Hereinafter Sioux Nation]. 
22 See infra section III.B–III.C.  
23 Helen Szoke, Address at the Sustainable Mining Symposium at 
Melbourne Business School, Indigenous Peoples, Community rights and 
Mining: Free, Prior and Informed Consent (May 17, 2013) (on file with 
author). 
24 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res 61/295, 
(Sept. 13, 2007) at 10, 11(2), 19, 28(1), 29(2), 32(2) (Sept. 13, 2007) 
[hereinafter UNDRIP]. I assume the Standing Rock Sioux self-identify as 
“Indigenous peoples” given their invocation of rights contained in UNDRIP. 
For a discussion on the term “Indigenous peoples” see, e.g., KATHLEEN 
BIRRELL, INDIGENEITY: BEFORE AND BEYOND THE LAW 7–24 (2016); 
RONALD NIEZEN, THE ORIGINS OF INDIGENISM 3–5 (2003). 
25 See infra Part IV. There is a debate about whether FPIC provides 
Indigenous peoples with a veto. 
26 See U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107, 15; Press Release, Robert Hagen, US 
advisor statement on U.S. Mission to the U. N. on the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples Assembly (Sept. 13, 2007); President of the 
U.S., Remarks at the White House Tribal Nations Conference (Dec. 16, 
2010); but cf, Sheryl Lightfoot, Selective Endorsement without Intent to 
Implement: Indigenous Rights and the Anglosphere, 16(1) INT’L J HUM. 
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summary process for granting or withholding consent, may be 
too vague to operate as a binding legal standard.27 Where states 
do not embrace FPIC, international instruments that recognize 
FPIC lack a ‘legal’ means of resistance. Despite the failings of 
the state system and the uphill battle for broader recognition of 
the Indigenous peoples’ rights movement in the United States, 
the Sioux Tribe’s activism reveals how it is claiming and 
invoking FPIC in global legal spaces. 
Part Five describes the development and use of FPIC 
according to a map of law in global spaces. Settler-state 
resistance to Indigenous rights has allowed Indigenous peoples 
to develop means of resistance at sites of nonstate legality. To 
articulate how FPIC has discursively developed throughout 
multiple and overlapping legal levels, this article relies on 
William Twining’s map of global law.28 From a state-centric, 
positivist perspective, the extra-national levels are often 
identified as ‘soft law’ or as legally nonbinding.29 Even if FPIC 
is soft law, when FPIC is “operationalized” according to the 
problem-solving approach in global spaces, as the Sioux Tribe 
exemplify, it puts pressure on and may destabilize projects.30 
This article concludes that the Sioux Tribe, along with its 
intercommunal networks, is using different levels of legality in 
new and novel ways that are not explainable under state-based 
                                                
RTS. 100, 103, 114–15 (2012) (critical appraisal of that speech); also, James 
Anaya, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights 
andFundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, Promotion & Prot. of All 
Human Rights, Civil, Political Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, 
Including the Right to Development, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/34 (July 
15, 2009) [hereinafter Promotion and Protection]; U.N. General Assembly, 
Meeting Record, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 11–14 (Sept. 13, 
2007); Peter Vaughn, Statement of Peter Vaughn to the Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues, Representative of Australia, on behalf of Australia, 
New Zealand and the U.S., on Free, Prior and Informed Consent (May 22, 
2006); Tara Ward, The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: 
Indigenous Peoples’ Participation Rights within International Law, 10(2) 
NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 54, 59 (2011). 
27 Robert T. Coulter, Free Prior and Informed Consent: Not the Right it is 
Made Out to Be, INDIAN RES. LAW CTR. (Oct. 31, 2013), 
http://indianlaw.org/sites/default/files/FPIC_RTC_Oct2013.pdf.  
28 See generally WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY 
139 (2000) [hereinafter GLOBALISATION]. Tamanaha has similarly argued 
that there are areas of legality. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal 
Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYD L. REV. 375, 397 
(2008). H. Patrick Glenn wrote of co-existing different legal ‘traditions’. 
LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 61–98 
(4th ed. 2010).  
29 Infra section IV.B. 
30 Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12. 
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legalities or even a combination of state and international 
legalities. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SIOUX TRIBE 
The Sioux Tribe’s opposition to the DAPL is animated 
by more than water-protection and the placement of a pipeline. 
Those who are identifiable as “the Sioux Tribe” have been 
forcefully dispossessed, marginalized and made precarious by 
the federal government and its legal machinations. This short 
history also establishes that the land involved in the DAPL 
construction is disputed, despite how government and industry 
actors treat the dispute as though it is resolved. 
A. Who Are the Sioux? 
Three distinct dialects refer to themselves as the Lakota, 
Dakota, and Nakota, which comprise the “alliance of friends.”31 
Together, they identify themselves as Oceti Sakowin or Seven 
Council Fires.32 The Oceti Sakowin were originally from 
woodland areas in modern-day Minnesota, but were forced 
westward onto the plains by the Ojibwa and Cree who received 
guns and ammunition from French fur traders in the seventeenth 
century.33 In time, the Oceti Sakown became known to others 
under the name “Sioux,” which is a linguistic bastardization of 
the Ojibwa word Nadouwesou that means snakes, small adder, 
or enemy.34 In the seventeenth century, French traders shortened 
Nadouwesou to “Sou,” which they wrote as “Sioux.”35  
                                                
31 EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS/WHITE JUSTICE: THE SIOUX NATION 
VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT 4 (1991); ROBERT M. 
UTLEY, THE LAST DAYS OF THE SIOUX NATION 6 (1963). 
32 Oceti Sakowin Camp, History, http://www.ocetisakowincamp.org/history 
(last visited July 31, 2017) (list the Seven Council Fires as the 
Mdewakanton, Wahpekute, Sisitonawan/Sisseton, Wahpetonwan, 
Ihanktown/Lower Yanktonai, Ihanktowana/Upper Yanktoni and Tetowan); 
MICHAEL JOHNSON & JONATHAN SMITH, THE TRIBES OF THE SIOUX NATION 
5 (2000). 
33 UTLEY, supra note 31, at 6 (uses the word “Chippewa” another name for 
the Ojibwe); LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 4–5; JOHNSON & SMITH, supra 
note 32, at 4-5. 
34 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, History, https://www.standingrock.org/ 
content/history (last visited July 31, 2017); LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 4 
(“nadoueissiw”); JOHNSON & SMITH, supra note 32, at 4 (“nadowe-is-iw-
ug”). 
35 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, History, https://www.standingrock.org/ 
content/history (last visited July 31, 2017). 
 181 
Between the seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, 
the Sioux Tribe expanded its territories throughout the plains 
regions to the extent that Edward Lazarus saw the Sioux as an 
“empire.”36 During that time, each band had a chief, but the chief 
was not the ruler or executive power of the band, tribe, or the 
entire Oceti Sakowin. Robert Utley describes how the Oceti 
Sakowin’s internal government changed because of contact with 
‘whites’ in the mid-nineteenth century: 
This system of tribal government operated only 
during the summer months, when the bands came 
together as a tribe to hunt and to make work. It 
worked well enough, but when increasing 
numbers of whites moved westward in the middle 
nineteenth century, posing a sustained menace to 
the Indian way of life, it proved too weak. 
Paradoxically, the white officials injected more 
authoritarianism into the system. Ignorant of the 
realities of Sioux political organization, they 
found it convenient to deal with a tribe through a 
single leader and persuaded each tribe to choose 
a head chief . . . The officials’ assumption that a 
chief ruled absolutely over his people led to many 
misunderstandings between the two races.37 
Utley explains that those known as the “Sioux” were 
already undergoing changes when, in 1849,38 prospectors 
discovered gold in California, and American civilians began 
flooding the Sioux Tribe’s territory.39 To ensure that settlers 
would remain safe inside Indian territories, the federal 
government gathered representatives from potentially affected 
Tribes—including the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho—and 
offered them a yearly annuity in return for the safety of American 
citizens.40 This agreement was the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851, 
which recognized the “Sioux” or “Dahcotah” Nation 
                                                
36 LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 7. 
37 UTLEY, supra note 31, at 10. 
38 LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 7–20. 
39 Id. at 15–16. 
40 Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stats. 749, art. 7 (Sept. 17, 1851), [hereinafter 
‘1851 Fort Laramie Treaty’] (provided an annuity of fifty thousand dollars 
for fifty years, which the United States Congress changed to ten years when 
ratified). 
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territories.41 The tribal representatives were tribal chiefs who did 
not rule absolutely over the Oceti Sakowin, but the federal 
government considered them leaders of nations, rather than 
viewing them as part of their own complex legal arrangements.42 
That the Oceti Sakowin were identified as “Sioux” by mid-
nineteenth century suggests that how others understood the 
Tribe, rather than how it understood and identified itself, was 
already salient.43 The 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty continued a 
process of legally forming the Oceti Sakowin into the Sioux and 
the Dakota by tethering them to territory.44 
B. The Formation of the Great Sioux Nation and Its 
Fragmentation 
In the 1860s, the Civil War created a shortage of gold and 
silver, which renewed American interest in resource 
exploitation.45 When prospectors discovered gold in what would 
become known as Montana, American civilians again flooded 
into and across the Sioux Tribe’s territories. Violence between 
Indian Nations and American citizens in Minnesota spilled into 
the Sioux Tribe’s territory, which led to Red Cloud’s War.46 The 
federal government sued for peace, which resulted in the 1868 
Fort Laramie Treaty.47 In addition to temporarily ceasing 
hostilities, the 1868 Treaty acknowledged lands belonging to the 
Great Sioux Nation, which started on the eastern bank of the 
Missouri River and encapsulated the entirety of western South 
                                                
41 Id. at art. 5. (Article 4 guarantees safety of United States citizens. Article 
2 guarantees a federal right to construct roads through the Tribal-Nation 
lands codified by the Treaty.); see, LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 18 (claiming 
the 1851 Treaty was deliberately insensitive to Sioux culture and 
definitions). 
42 UTLEY, supra note 31, at 10. 
43 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty, supra note 40, at art. 5. 
44 Treaty with the Sioux, Sept. 23, 1805 (approved by the U.S. Senate on 
Apr. 16, 1808, never ratified); Treaty with the Sioux of the Lakes, July 19, 
1815, 7 Stat., 126., Ratified Dec. 26, 1815; Treaty with the Sioux of St. 
Peter’s River, July 19, 1815., 7 Stat., 127. Ratified Dec. 26, 1815; Treaty 
with the Sioux, June 1, 1816, 7 State., 143, Proclamation, Dec. 30, 1816; 
Treaty with the Teton, Etc., Sioux, June 22, 1825, 7 Stat., 250, 
Proclamation, Feb. 6, 1825; Treaty with the Sioux, Etc., Aug. 19, 1825, 7 
Stat., 272, Proclamation Feb. 6, 1826. Those treaties do not signify the 
Sioux as a singular unity as would the 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty.  
45 LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 26–30. 
46 Id. 
47 Treaty of Fort Laramie, 15 Stat. 635, (Apr. 29, 1868) [hereinafter ‘1868 
Fort Laramie Treaty’]. 
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Dakota.48 Article XII specified that “at least three-fourth of all 
the adult male Indians occupying or interest[ed] in the” land 
must consent to abrogate any article or cede territory.49 The 1868 
Treaty formed the Sioux or Dahcotah Nations into the Great 
Sioux Nation, as it further leashed that legal identification to a 
particular territory. 
The cessation of hostilities generated by the 1868 Fort 
Laramie Treaty would not last. The United States would soon 
trigger violence and would never obtain the consent of three-
fourths of the Great Sioux Nation’s adult male population. 
Following rumors of gold in the Black Hills, General George 
Custer entered the Great Sioux Nation territory to confirm the 
rumors.50 When the presence of gold was confirmed, the federal 
government attempted to purchase the Black Hills, which the 
Great Sioux Nation rejected.51 The federal government then 
adopted an unofficial policy of encouraging illegal prospecting 
in the Black Hills.52 Again, American settlers flooded into the 
Sioux Tribe’s territory, this time with the intent to mine, which 
led to the Great Sioux War and the most infamous Native 
American/United States conflict, the Battle of Little Bighorn.53 
After Sitting Bull and other native leaders soundly defeated 
General Custer, the tides of war turned against the Great Sioux 
Nation. Despite the 1868 Treaty specifying that “at least three-
fourths of all the adult male Indians occupying or interest[ed] in 
the [land]” would have to sign away land rights, in 1877 a United 
States Commission forced the Sioux to cede the Black Hills, 
obtaining signatures from only ten percent of the Sioux Nation’s 
adult male population.54 In 1980, the United States Supreme 
                                                
48 Id. arts. II, X, XI (also guaranteed large amounts of land for hunting 
outside the reservation; and subsistence rations until 1872). 
49 Id. art. XII. 
50 Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 371, 376–77. 
51 Id. at 379. 
52 John P. LaVelle, Rescuing Paha Sapa: Achieving Environmental Justice 
by Restoring the Great Grasslands and Returning the Sacred Black Hills to 
the Great Sioux Nation, 5 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RES. J. 40, 45 n. 27 (2001) 
citing Exhibits in Appendix C To Reply Brief of Sioux Nation in Court of 
Claims No. 148–78, reprinted in Appendix Accompanying Brief of 
Respondent Sioux Nation at 59; Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 371 (reprinted 
letter from Lt. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, commander of the Military Div. of 
the Missouri, to Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, commander of the Dep’t of 
Dakota, Nov. 9, 1875). 
53 The federal government re-named the Sioux “hostiles.” Sioux Nation, 448 
U.S. at 379; LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 74. 
54 Acts of Forty-Fourth Congress, Second Session, Feb. 28, 1877 Ch. 72, 
Art. 1, 19 Stat. 254; Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 381–82; LaVelle, supra note 
52, at 51–54; LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 90–2. 
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Court would later agree with the Sioux Nation that the federal 
government’s actions in the Black Hills contravened the 1868 
Treaty.55 However, in 1877, the Great Sioux Nation was 
powerless to prevent the United States from taking legal 
ownership.56 
Amidst these exercises in overt violence, the federal 
government adopted a new tactic.57 The federal government 
decided to regulate tribes and Indian Nations, including the Great 
Sioux Nation, by passing domestic legislation, rather than 
continuing to enter into treaties.58 The following 1887 General 
Allotment Act, also called the “Dawes Act,” sought to assimilate 
Native Americans into American society.59 It partitioned 
territories held by tribes or bands into alienable property rights 
for families.60 Where the 1851 and 1868 Laramie Treaties 
centralized and formalized the Great Sioux Nation, the 
subsequent Sioux Act of 1889 broke the Great Sioux Nation into 
five separate and fragmented reservations, one of which is the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.61 The Sioux Act of 1889 also 
claimed title to the land upon which the federal government 
would later build the Oahe dam. 
C. Twentieth-century Developments 
In 1934, the United States Congress passed the Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA), also called the “Indian New Deal.”62 
The IRA did not diminish the size of the Standing Rock or 
Cheyenne River Reservations, but it set the stage for natural 
                                                
55 Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 423–24. 
56 LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 90–2. 
57 See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED 15 (Mauro 
Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., David Macey trans. (2003) (“politics is 
the continuation of war by other means”). Foucault’s statement reverses 
Karl von Clausewitz’s dictum that war is “the continuation of policy by 
other means.” KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, WAR POLITICS AND POWER 83 
(1967). 
58 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1871) (claims that “no obligation of any treaty lawfully 
made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March 3, 
1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.”). 
59 General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388, Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 25 U.S.C.A. 
311. 
60 Id. §§ 5, 7. 
61 An act to divide a portion of the reservation of the Sioux Nation of 
Indians in Dakota into separate reservations and to secure the 
relinquishment of the Indian title to the remainder, and for other purposes, 
25 Stat. 889 (Mar. 2, 1889). 
62 Indian Reorganization Act, Pub. L. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (June 18, 1934). 
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resource exploitation to do so.63 After World War II, the federal 
government began damming its major river systems, including 
the Missouri River, to generate hydroelectric power.64 The Oahe 
Dam’s construction on the Missouri River in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s created Lake Oahe,65 which forcefully displaced 
members of the Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribes.66 Lake Oahe flooded 160,889 acres of the most densely 
forested and resource-rich Sioux lands, which resulted in the 
single largest public works destruction of Indian land.67 Again, 
American desire for natural resources dispossessed the Oceti 
Sakowin. 
The Sioux Tribe’s members were actively resisting 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s68 and won a significant Supreme 
Court case in 1980. Justice Blackmun and seven Justices agreed 
with the Sioux Nation that the federal government had illegally 
taken the Black Hills in contravention of the 1868 Treaty.69 
Although the Sioux Nation sought to have the Black Hills 
                                                
63 The National Industrial Recovery Act created the Public Works 
Administration, which would initiate the nationwide dam infrastructure 
projects. MICHAEL J. LAWSON JR., DAMMED INDIANS: THE PICK-SLOAN 
PLAN AND THE MISSOURI RIVER SIOUX, 1944-1980 11–12 (1994). 
64 Pick-Sloan Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. 78-534, Dec. 22, 1944, 58 
Stat. 887. For a detailed chronicle of the planning for the dam, its effect on 
the Sioux and their resistance, see generally LAWSON, supra note 63. The 
1953 House Concurrent Resolution 108 officially commenced termination, 
which sought to end the trustee relationship and have Indians accept 
American citizenship. For a general account of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe’s 
resistance to termination see EDWARD CHARLES VALANDRA, NOT WITHOUT 
OUR CONSENT: LAKOTA RESISTANCE TO TERMINATION, 1950–59 (2006). 
65An Act to designate the Oahe Reservoir on the Missouri River in the States 
of North Dakota and South Dakota as Lake Oahe, H.R. 2901, Mar. 21, 1968, 
Pub. L. 90-270 (named Lake Oahe “in honor of the Indian people who 
inhabited the great Missouri River Basin”). 
66 LAWSON, supra note 63, at xx-xxi. The Standing Rock Sioux received 
$90,600,000 for damages for the forced resettlement, $4,660,00 for 
irrigation development and established a 2,380-acre irrigation area on their 
reservation. Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjust Act of 1992 
Title XXXV, Pub. L. 102-575. 
67 LAWSON, supra note 63, at 50–51. 
68 Some Sioux Tribes members of the American Indian Movement sought to 
remove Oglala Sioux tribal president Richard Wilson from power in 1973. 
He was supported by the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs and widely 
thought to be corrupt. Civil disobedience lead to violence and a standoff 
with FBI officers. Steven Curry later wrote, “[i]t would seem that the aim of 
these Oglala traditionalists was to assert a right to tribal self-government in 
contradiction to the powers of the BIA and the structures imposed by the 
[Indian Reorganization Act].” STEVEN CURRY, INDIGENOUS SOVEREIGNTY 
AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROJECT 14 (2004). The defiant ‘traditionalists’ 
would later appeal to the U.N. Id. at 15. Their appeal would influence the 
developments described infra section V.C. 
69 Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 371, 434–45 (Rehnquist dissenting). 
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returned to it, Blackmun ordered just compensation and 
interest.70 Out of fear that accepting the money would abrogate 
the 1868 Treaty, the Sioux Tribe never accepted the money, 
leaving it to sit in a Bureau of Indian Affairs bank account.71 The 
Sioux Nation maintains that the land is legally and morally 
theirs.72 In 2012, the United Nations (U.N.) Special Rapporteur 
on the rights of Indigenous peoples James Anaya’s report on 
Indigenous peoples in the United States highlighted the Sioux 
Tribe’s dispossession.73 In that report, Anaya noted the 
inadequately controlled development of extractive industries 
over Indian land,74 and called upon the federal government to 
redress treaty violations and non-consensual taking by returning 
traditional lands to Indian control.75 In making these points, 
Anaya singled out the taking of the Black Hills as a paradigm 
case that “serve[s] as a constant visible reminder of their loss.”76 
This all-too-brief brief history contextualizes the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s recent opposition to the DAPL.77 
Its opposition is about an oil pipeline under Lake Oahe near 
Standing Rock Reservation. But it is neither a simple dispute nor 
solely about a pipeline. For at least 160 years, natural resource 
demands combined with legal machinations and no small 
amount of subterfuge, transformed the Oceti Sakowin’s empire 
into the Sioux or Dahcotah Nation, the Great Sioux Nation, and 
then the various reservation-based Sioux Tribes. According to 
the 1868 Treaty, the Great Sioux Nation owns the land beginning 
on the eastern bank of the Missouri River, which includes the 
lands upon which the Oahe dam was constructed and Lake Oahe 
now floods. The Sioux Tribe maintains that Treaty is still in full 
effect.78 If it appears that the Sioux Tribe has been buffeted about 
                                                
70 Id. at 423–24. 
71 James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous peoples), 
The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in the United States of America, 
Addendum, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/47/Add.1, ¶40. [hereinafter The situation 
in the US]. 
72 Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the 
Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA. L. Rev. 1615, 1643 (2000). 
73 The Situation in the US, supra note 71. 
74 Id. at ¶ 41. 
75 Id. at ¶ 90. 
76 Id. at ¶ 40. 
77 More recent developments by the Sioux Tribe in the late twentieth century 
is provided infra Part V. 
78 Although the Supreme Court found that the United States contravened the 
1868 Treaty, it also sought to indemnify the Sioux Nation for its loss of 
land. There is precedent that accepting the money extinguishes the land 
claim. See United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 39, 49 (1985); Julie Ann 
Fishel, The Western Shoshone Struggle: Opening Doors for Indigenous 
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by the whims of the federal government, that is not necessarily 
the case.79 The following explains how the Tribe has continued 
to actively resist in ways that lawyers might overlook. 
III. THE SIOUX TRIBE’S OPPOSITION TO THE DAPL 
This section focuses on the struggles at the federal level 
of legality. In the following sections, it is argued that a full 
analysis of the Sioux Tribe’s opposition to the DAPL should be 
analyzed according to a broader, nonstate-centric perspective, 
rather than one that focuses narrowly on the federal level of 
legality. The Sioux Tribe sought to participate in resolving 
common problems—including how to consult and who has the 
power to participate in permitting the DAPL over disputed 
territory—by requesting government-to-government 
consultation.80 To the extent that federal government and 
industry actors saw a problem, it was a problem of permitting, 
which they saw as solvable according to federal law.81 In turning 
to federal law, federal government and industry actors continued 
dealing with the Sioux Tribe according to domestic law,82 as 
opposed to engaging in government-to-government relations.83 
For Cottrell and Trubek, a state-based hierarchical 
approach to legality conforms to “[c]lassical theories of law 
[which] stress the importance of substantive norms, with 
procedure seen simply as a tool for ensuring compliance with 
these norms.”84 They explain that “[c]ollective problem solving 
involves a common understanding that a problem exists, 
consensus that it ought to be solved, and the mobilization of 
appropriate expertise and resource to do so.”85 Instead of 
“creating a framework for the construction of new knowledge” 
                                                
Rights, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 52 (2007). Indicative of 
the federal government’s policy towards Tribes, the federal government 
accepted the money from itself on behalf of the Shoshone, thereby 
extinguishing the Shoshone’s claim. See also Standing Rock III, supra note 
1, at 131 (“Standing Rock believes that the Corps’ position “misunderstands 
the Tribe’s Treaty rights,” which “embody the fundamental right of a people 
tied to a place since time immemorial” and thus demand a more 
“existential” analysis.”). 
79 See supra notes 66, 69 and accompanying text; also infra Part V. 
80 Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 9–10, 18–19; see infra sections III.B–C. 
81 Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 19. 
82 Consistent with 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1871), supra note 58. 
83 There are various interpretations of “government-to-government”. See 
infra sections III.B–C. 
84 Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12, at 368. 
85 Id. at 367. 
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and “promoting participation” to “translate knowledge into 
norms” that would guide future behavior and compliance about 
how to proceed,86 the permitting federal agency and pipeline 
developer federal law, which further excluded and marginalized 
the Sioux Tribe. In adhering to the federal legal standards, the 
federal government and pipeline developer simply denied the 
existence of a common problem to be resolved. In response, the 
Sioux Tribe has used “moral suasion, the potential for public 
embarrassment, and reputation costs” to either “retain quality 
participation” or generate a “penalty default and a destabilization 
regime.”87 
In effect, the Sioux Tribe used multiple levels of legality 
and effectively mobilized federal law as one legal tool to oppose 
the project.88 Consider first the applicable federal law, what 
consultation processes were undertaken by the federal 
government and pipeline developer, the legal dispute, and 
finally, the protest. The Sioux Tribe has successfully used United 
States legal mechanisms to its advantage.89 It has also used 
legality in global spaces, more recent developments of a different 
kind of legality that may mitigate the more pernicious effects of 
United States law on tribes.90 
A. The Applicable Federal Law 
Dakota Access, LLC, a subsidiary of Energy Transfer 
Crude Oil Company, is the entity developing the DAPL.91 The 
DAPL is a 1,172-mile long pipeline that would transport crude 
oil from the fields near Stanley, North Dakota to Patoka, 
Illinois.92 Most of the pipeline, around 99% of it, traverses 
private land, which does not require permitting.93 The DAPL 
only requires federal permitting where it crosses federally 
regulated lands and waters, including Lake Oahe.94 As such, the 
                                                
86 Id. at 367. 
87 Id. at 374. 
88 Carpenter & Riley, supra note 18, at 177. 
89 See infra section III.C; Standing Rock III, supra note 2. 
90 S. James Anaya & Sergio Puig, Mitigating State Sovereignty: The Duty to 
Consult with Indigenous Peoples, ARIZ. L. STUD., Discussion Paper No. 16-
42, 14 (2016); Carpenter & Riley, supra note 18, at 189–98. 
91 Energy Transfer Partners, The Route, http://landowners. 
daplpipelinefacts.com/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2017). 
92 Id. 
93 Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 7. 
94 U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Frequently Asked Questions DAPL, 
http://www.nwo.usace.army.mil/Media/Fact-Sheets/Fact-Sheet-Article-
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agency responsible for permitting, the United States Army Corps 
of Engineers (Corps), only has permitting and regulatory 
jurisdiction over 1% of the DAPL. The thorny issue is that 
according to the 1868 Treaty, the land starting on the eastern 
bank of the Missouri River, which is now the eastern boundary 
of Lake Oahe, belongs to the Great Sioux Nation.95  
Under the 1868 Treaty, the federal government cannot do 
anything with that land without the consent of three-quarters of 
the the Sioux Nation’s adult male population.96 Furthermore, 
under the 1851 Treaty, the DAPL cuts through the northernmost 
portion of the Sioux Tribe’s territory. As such, the Sioux Tribe 
might maintain jurisdiction (from its legal perspective) over 
lands the federal government regulates as private property, as 
well as territory starting on the east bank of the Missouri River, 
which is now the boundary of Lake Oahe. For its part, Dakota 
Access, LLC, claims, “[t]he Dakota Access Pipeline Does Not 
Cross Land Owned by the Standing Rock Sioux.”97 While true 
under extant federal law, it is inaccurate according to the 1868 
Treaty, the 1851 Treaty, and perhaps, the Sioux Tribe’s view of 
land ownership.98 Hence, Dakota Access, LLC, and the Corps 
claim they complied with federal law and provided the Sioux 
opportunities for consultation, but the Sioux were unwilling to 
engage in meaningful consultation.99 Within federal court, the 
controversy was whether the federal government applied its own 
legal standards in permitting the project, not whether conflicting 
jurisdictional claims arose under the Treaties.100 An overview of 
federal law is required to understand the ways in which the 
                                                
View/Article/749823/frequently-asked-questions-dapl/ (last visited July 31, 
2017). 
95 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, supra note 47. 
96 Id. at art XII. 
97 Dakota Access Pipeline Facts, The Dakota Access Pipeline Does Not 
Cross Land Owned by the Standing Rock Sioux, 
https://daplpipelinefacts.com/dt_articles/the-dakota-access-pipeline-does-
not-cross-land-belonging-to-the-standing-rock-sioux/ (last visited July 31, 
2017). 
98 See Background on the DAPL, supra note 3, at 1 (“the Tribe maintains a 
sovereign interest in protecting its cultural resources and patrimony that 
remain with the land . . . The Tribe opposes DAPL because we must honor 
our ancestors and protect our sacred sites and our precious waters.”). 
99 Decl. of William S. Scherman Supp. Mot. Summ. J., (Dec. 6, 2016), Ex. J, 
Tr. of Status Conference Before the Honorable James E. Boasberg (Sept. 16, 
2016), at 5, Standing Rock I, supra note 2. 
100 The Sioux Tribe’s initial legal challenge was principally on National 
Historic Preservation Act grounds as opposed to National Environmental 
Policy Act grounds. Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 7; cf. Standing Rock 
III, supra note 2. 
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Corps, Dakota Access, LLC, and the Sioux Tribe adopt different 
approaches to legality. 
The DAPL was planned to cross under Lake Oahe, a 
reservoir on the Missouri River. According to federal law, the 
Missouri River is a United States navigable waterway, and thus 
the Clean Water Act,101 the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,102 
and the National Environmental Policy Act103 (NEPA) apply. To 
comply with NEPA, an agency must complete an environmental 
assessment (EA); and if the EA generates a finding of no 
significant impact, then an environmental impact statement 
(EIS) does not need to be completed. The National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA) also applies because there may be 
Tribal historic sites on the land involved, which would require 
consultation with tribes in some circumstances under Section 
106.104 Lastly, National Permit 12 is a national streamlined 
infrastructure permitting scheme, which applies because the 
DAPL is regulated as infrastructure.105 Essentially, as long as the 
Corps satisfies the requirements of NHPA and NEPA, then 
Nationwide Permit 12 enables the Corps to grant Dakota Access, 
LLC an easement for the DAPL’s construction under Lake Oahe. 
Additional complicating legal features are Executive 
Orders or Executive Memorandums, which influence how 
federal agencies operate. For example, Executive Order 13,175 
directs federal agencies to “meaningfully consult” with tribes.106 
                                                
101 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 
(1972); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1367 (2000), §§ 131(a), 1342(a). The Corps of 
Engineers can issue individual or general permits if the project falls within a 
precisely defined activity. Id. § 1344(e)(1); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, 803 F.3d 31, 38–40 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
102 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970) (originally enacted, Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 
1152). The Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899 forbids construction upon the 
navigable waters of the United States without permission from the Corps. 
Id. § 322.3(a). Like the Clean Water Act, the Corps may discharge its duty 
imposed by the Rivers and Harbors Act according to General permits, such 
as Nationwide Permit 12. 
103 83 Stat. 852 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (2012). 
104 54 U.S.C. §§ 300101(1) et seq. Section 106 requires federal agencies, 
like the Corps, to consider their effects on tribal lands that are of cultural or 
religious significance. 
105 Reissuance of Nationwide Permits (NWP 12), 77 Fed Reg. 10,184 (Feb. 
12, 2012). General conditions constrain the issuance of general permits, one 
of which requires the Corps district engineers either to verify that projects 
will not impact potential historic sites or to complete tribal consultations as 
stipulated by the NHPA. Id. at 10,284. 
106 Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); Colette 
Routel & Jeffrey Holth, Toward Genuine Tribal Consultation in the 21st 
Century, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 417, 443–48, 453–75 (2012–13) 
(arguing that a more robust version of consultation would substantively 
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President Obama’s memorandum regarding Executive Order 
13,175 directs federal agencies to engage in regular and 
meaningful consultation and collaboration with tribes involving 
action taken on federal lands when that action impacts tribal 
interests.107 Michael Eitner has argued that even if it appears 
laudatory, the standard for meeting “meaningful consultation” 
remains elusive and inadequate.108 The importance of Executive 
Order 13,175 to the DAPL project may have been altered by 
President Trump’s Executive Memorandum on the DAPL,109 
which sought to advance its permitting. 
Although the Sioux Tribe has challenged the Corps’ 
compliance with NHPA and NEPA, the heart of the Standing 
Rock Sioux Tribe’s opposition to the DAPL is a failure of the 
federal government to consult and obtain its consent.110 The 
Sioux Tribe has turned to federal law, but the dispute in federal 
legal space is one level in a dispute that involves legalities in 
global spaces, including nonstate, intercommunal, international, 
regional, and transnational legalities. 
To satisfy the NHPA and NEPA, the Corps and Dakota 
Access, LLC contacted Sioux Tribe leaders and cultural heritage 
officers between 2014 and 2016.111 In the Sioux Tribe’s suits 
against the Corps and Dakota Access, LLC, United States 
District Court Judge Boasberg interpreted the Sioux Tribe’s 
requests for consultation according to federal legal standards, 
which is of course what a United States District Court Judge 
must do. Reading those opinions through the lens of a United 
                                                
fulfil the federal government’s trust responsibility to tribes); Michael Eitner, 
Meaningful Consultation with Tribal Governments: A Uniform Standard to 
Guarantee that Federal Agencies Properly Consider their Concerns, 85 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 867, 885–89 (2014). 
107 Barack Obama, Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the 
Heads of Executive Department and Agencies Regarding Tribal 
Consultation (Nov. 5, 2009). 
108 Eitner, supra note 106, at 885–94. Eitner argues it falls short of the 
United States’ trust responsibility to tribes because the standard of 
“meaningful consultation” is determined by each agency and Executive 
Orders do not provide a substantive cause of action if the agency does not 
engage in meaningful consultation with a tribe. Trust responsibility stems 
from Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (“the Indians . . . 
may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. 
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, 
which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession 
ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the 
United State resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”). 
109 Trump Memo, supra note 20. 
110 Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 7; Standing Rock III, supra note 2, at 
111; Sitting Bear & Borrero, supra note 5. 
111 Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 13–24. 
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States lawyer or judge is what Cottrell and Trubek call a “strictly 
legalist approach.”112 This approach “emphasize[s] command 
and control regulation in which courts and similar bodies that 
apply sanctions for noncompliance lay down and enforce 
relatively specific rules that define allowable behavior.”113  
Reading the DAPL dispute in that way misses that the 
territory in question “consists of multiple overlapping legal 
orders that transcend conventional state boundaries and bring 
many more participant actors into the regulatory arena.”114 Even 
if the Sioux Tribe is requesting that the courts uphold federal law 
in a broad manner, it is also asking to be consulted as an 
independent government that has unique insight and knowledge 
about the land (and its relationship to that land).115 Despite the 
Sioux Tribe’s bids to share information and work towards 
solving a territorial dispute, the Corps, Dakota Access, LLC, and 
the federal courts have strictly adhered to federal law and thus 
refuse to acknowledge the multiple and overlapping legal orders. 
Given jurisdictional limitations, the Corps and federal 
courts are likely unable to consider those other legal orders. In 
adhering to federal law, the Corps and the courts reveal their 
inability to adequately treat complex historical issues, such as 
the Sioux Tribe’s desire for consultation in this situation. The 
following summarizes District Court Judge Boasberg’s findings 
about the consultation processes. 
B. The Attempt to Consult? 
Beginning in 2014 and early 2015, the Corps and Dakota 
Access, LLC contacted the Sioux Tribe about the planning for 
the DAPL regarding their initial NHPA finding of “no historic 
properties affected.”116 After not hearing from the Sioux Tribe, 
the Corps “green-lighted the work” and only then received a 
letter from the Sioux Tribe requesting consultation.117 In 2015, a 
series of communications were traded between the Corps and 
various members of the Sioux Tribe’s government, including the 
former Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Chairman Archambault.118 
                                                
112 Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12, at 361. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 362. 
115 Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 19 (requesting “government-to-
government” consultation). 
116 Id. at 15. 
117 Id. at 16. 
118 Id. at 17–20. 
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The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Tribal Historic Preservation 
Officer, a position designated by the NHPA, wrote that the 
“Tribe looked forward to participating in future consultation 
prior to any work being completed . . . [and] to playing a primary 
role in any and all survey work and monitoring.”119 While one 
could read it as a request for the Corps or Dakota Access, LLC 
to comply with federal law, broader contextualization reveals a 
request for the State and industry to consult with the Tribe and 
treat it as an independent government, one with a primary role in 
supervising the project.120 Subsequent exchanges further reveal 
a divergence in legal approaches. 
The Corps then requested a meeting with members of the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. Tribe members responded, “after 
careful consideration . . . it is in the best interest . . . to decline 
participation in the site visits and walking the project corridor’s 
[area of projected effects] at this time until government-to-
government consultation has occurred for this project per 
[NHPA] Section 106 requirements as requested by the Standing 
Rock Sioux Tribe.”121 Judge Boasberg narrowly interpreted the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s request as “mean[ing] that the 
Corps needed to first hold the previously requested meeting 
between Chairman Archambault and Colonel Henderson [of the 
Corps].”122 In doing so, Judge Boasberg reduces “government-
to-government” or sovereign-to-sovereign discussion to 
government-representative-authorized-to-permit-the-project-to-
chairman or government-to-subject discussion. It could appear, 
as it did to Judge Boasberg, as though NHPA Section 106 is a 
direction to the Corps to gather information from potentially 
affected tribes. The Sioux Tribe’s request for government-to-
government consultation, however, suggests a broader view of 
Section 106, something akin to a meeting between more equal 
sovereign actors. 
Under NHPA Section 106, Judge Boasberg found that 
the Corps and members of the Tribe had “no fewer than seven 
meetings” between January and May 2016, including meetings 
to increase safety standards for constructing the pipeline under 
Lake Oahe.123 In early 2016, Dakota Access, LLC offered to 
conduct cultural surveys with several tribes, including the 
                                                
119 Id. at 18 (internal citations removed, emphasis in original). 
120 See, e.g., Background on the DAPL, supra note 3. 
121 Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 19 (emphasis added). 
122 Id. at 19. 
123 Id. at 21. 
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Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, to understand the cultural 
significance of the area.124 The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 
declined to participate, citing the survey’s limited scope, and 
“urged the Corps to redefine the area of potential effect to 
include the entire pipeline and asserted that it would send no 
experts to help identity cultural resources until this occurred.”125 
It might appear that the Sioux Tribe members are not 
willing to participate in consultation. However, given the 
ongoing territorial dispute, the Sioux Tribe’s opposition to the 
survey is not a simple unwillingness to participate. It appears as 
an unwillingness to be further subjected to a standard dictated by 
federal law. Judge Boasberg found that the Corps responded and 
explained that it did not “regulate or oversee the construction of 
pipelines, and [its] regulatory control is limited to only a small 
portion of the land and waterways that the pipeline traverses.”126 
One could read the dispute, as Judge Boasberg did, as a conflict 
in the interpretation of federal law, where the Corps is simply 
explaining that it has a minimal role to play in the DAPL 
permitting.127 On the other hand, it could be that the Sioux Tribe 
were maintaining its jurisdiction and knowledge over the area 
involved while resisting the imposition of federal law. 
Judge Boasberg noted that members of the Standing 
Rock Sioux Tribe visited Lake Oahe in March 2016 and pointed 
out areas of concern, which the Corps decided were outside the 
area of potential impact.128 Even if the pipeline construction 
would not “disturb those sites,” the Corps and Judge Boasberg 
seemed to miss that any use of the land the Sioux Tribe had not 
approved would be incommensurate with its approach and 
understanding of the disputed lands. 
The Corps then determined that the project had “no 
historic properties subject to effect” under the NHPA.129 
Members of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe objected.130 Shortly 
afterwards, the NHPA Advisory Council sent letters to the Corps 
questioning both the “no effect” determination and why the 
                                                
124 Id. at 22, 20–27 (full narrative of cultural surveys), 13–14 (process that 
Dakota Access, LLC undertook). 
125 Id. at 22. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. at 30–32.  
128 Id.at 22–23. 
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Corps was facing problems consulting with the Sioux Tribe.131 
In July 2016, the Corps attempted to finalize the DAPL 
permitting by publicly releasing a NEPA EA finding of no 
significant impact.132 The Standing Rock and Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribes initiated a lawsuit against the Corps and Dakota 
Access, LLC seeking an injunction against the granting of an 
easement for the DAPL.133 Around the same time the Sioux 
Tribe filed the lawsuit, it began cultivating international 
attention for its DAPL protest. The following two subsections 
describe the legal dispute and then the DAPL protest. 
C. The Legal Disputes 
The Sioux Tribe has pursued several rounds of legal 
challenges.134 First, when the Corps released its EA and moved 
towards issuing a permit for the DAPL, the Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe and the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe (collectively the 
Tribe) filed suit, claiming a failure to consult under Nationwide 
Permit 12, the Clean Water Act, the Rivers and Harbors Act, and 
the NHPA.135 At that time, the Tribe only sought a preliminary 
injunction on NHPA grounds rather than pursuing an 
environmental claim under NEPA.136 While waiting for a ruling 
on the injunction, Dakota Access, LLC bulldozed an area the 
Tribe claimed was of historical significance to its people.137 The 
bulldozing inflamed the protest but had little impact on the legal 
claim. 
                                                
131 Id. (Boasberg writes, the Advisory Council “also sent the Corps a series 
of letters about the adequacy of the Section 106 process around this time. 
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verification from the Corps of its consultation efforts and relayed concerns 
expressed to them by Archambault about the consultation (or lack thereof) 
that had occurred to date with Standing Rock.”). 
132 Id. at 24; Dakota Access, LLC & U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Omaha 
Dist., Envtl. Assessment: Dakota Access Pipeline Project, crossing of 
flowage easement & fed. lands, Mitigated Finding of No Significant Impact, 
Release no. 20160728-001 (July 25, 2016), Standing Rock I, supra note 2. 
133 Mot. Prelim. Inj. Req. Expedited Hr’g, (Aug. 4, 2016); Emergency Mot. 
TRO (Sept. 4, 2016), Standing Rock I, supra note 2. 
134 As of this time, there have been three rounds of litigation. The second 
maintained that the DAPL would desecrate sacred waters in contravention 
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The intermediary challenge is not 
discussed here. Standing Rock II, supra note 2. 
135 Compl. Declaratory & Injunctive Relief (July 27, 2016), Standing Rock 
I, supra note 1. 
136 Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 7–8. The NEPA claim would be 
advanced in February 2017 in Standing Rock III, supra note 2. 
137 Emergency Mot. TRO (Sept. 4, 2016), Standing Rock I, supra note 2. 
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Judge Boasberg denied the Tribe’s injunction, finding 
that the Corps “has likely complied with the NHPA and that the 
Tribe has not shown it will suffer injury that would be prevented 
by any injunction.”138 On the same day of the decision and likely 
in response to the protest, the Department of Justice, Department 
of Army, and Department of Interior issued a joint statement that 
halted permitting over Indian lands until they reviewed their 
approaches to tribal consultation.139 
One month after Judge Boasberg’s ruling and in response 
to the protest, the Corps delayed granting the easement around 
Lake Oahe because it “determined that additional discussion and 
analysis [were] warranted in light of the history of the Great 
Sioux Nation’s dispossessions of lands, the importance of Lake 
Oahe to the Tribe, our government-to-government relationship, 
and the statute governing easements through government 
property.”140 
That statement treats “government-to-government” in a 
way that is closer to that urged by the Sioux Tribe. It is more 
robustly used than Judge Boasberg’s interpretation of NHPA 
Section 106.141 The following day, Dakota Access, LLC filed 
suit against Corps, claiming that it had all permits required under 
federal law.142 Dakota Access, LLC claimed, “[t]he much 
preferred course would have been for political interference not 
to have created such costly delay in the completion of a mere 
formality. That would have avoided the need to burden this 
                                                
138 Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 7. 
139 Press Release, Joint Statement from the Department of Justice, the 
Department of the Army & the Department of the Interior Regarding 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, (Sept. 8, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joint-statement-department-justice-
department-army-and-department-interior-regarding-standing. 
140 Moira Kelley, U.S. Army, Army will not grant easement for Dakota 
Access Pipeline (Dec. 4, 2016), https://www.army.mil/article/179095/ 
army_will_not_grant_easement_for_dakota_access_pipeline_crossing 
(emphasis added); Jo-Ellen Darcy, Proposed Dakota Access Pipeline 
Crossing at Lake Oahe, North Dakota, Memorandum for Commander, U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, Dec. 4, 2016; see also, Press Release, Stand with 
Standing Rock, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Statement on United States 
Army Corps of Engineers Decision to Not Grant Easement, (Dec. 4, 2016), 
http://standwithstandingrock.net/standing-rock-sioux-tribes-statement-u-s-
army-corps-engineers-decision-not-grant-easement/. 
141 Standing Rock I, supra note 2, 30–32. 
142 Dakota Access, LLC’s Answer to Intervenor-Pl. Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribe’s First Am. Compl. Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, & Cross-Cl. Def. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, (Nov. 15, 2016) at 49–50, Standing Rock I, 
supra note 2. 
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Court with a legal dispute[.]”143 The line between political 
pressure and legal standard may appear obvious under what 
Cottrell and Trubek call a “strictly legalist approach” to federal 
law.144 It is not so obvious when considering historical injustices 
or the “multiple overlapping legal orders that transcend 
conventional state boundaries.”145 
On December 4, 2016, the Corps announced it would 
consider the viability of alternative routes for the pipeline by 
engaging in an EIS under NEPA.146 Media outlets hailed the 
Corps’ announcement as a “major win” and a “victory” for the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.147 Despite the laudatory language, 
soon after taking office President Trump issued an Executive 
Memorandum directing the Corps to reconsider the effectiveness 
of its EA.148 The Department of Army then terminated the EIS, 
and the Corps granted an easement for the pipeline in early 
February 2017.149 By March, the DAPL was operational.150 In 
response, the Sioux Tribe initiated a second round of legal 
challenges. 
In the second round, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 
challenged the sufficiency of review under the NEPA with 
specific regard to the Sioux Tribe’s 1851 Treaty rights 
implicating water, hunting, and fishing.151 The Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe argued that the Treaty rights should be understood 
as “rights which embody the fundamental rights of a people tied 
                                                
143 Dakota Access, LLC’s Answer to Intervenor-Pl. Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribe’s First Am. Compl. Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, & Cross-Cl. Def. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, (Nov. 15, 2016) at 49, Standing Rock I, supra 
note 1. 
144 Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12, at 361. 
145 Id. at 362. 
146 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
147 See, e.g., Jack Healy & Nicholas Fandos, Protesters Gain Victory in 
Fight Over Dakota Access Oil Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/04/us/federal-officials-to-explore-
different-route-for-dakota-pipeline.html. 
148 Trump memo, supra note 20. 
149 Press Release, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Corps grants easement to 
Dakota Access, LLC, (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.nwo.usace.army.mil/ 
Media/News-Releases/Article/1077134/corps-grants-easement-to-dakota-
access-llc/ [https://perma.cc/84VY-XSN9]; Brenda S. Bowen, Dep’t of 
Army, Notice of Termination of the Intent to Prepare an Envtl. Impact 
Statement in Connection with Dakota Access, LLC’s Request for an 
Easement to Cross Lake Oahe, North Dakota, Feb. 7, 2017. 
150 Press Release, Stand with Standing Rock, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 
Chairman responds to oil in DAPL (Mar. 28, 2017) 
http://standwithstandingrock.net/standing-rock-sioux-tribe-chairman-
responds-oil-dapl/ [https://perma.cc/LU3Z-NB3X]. 
151 Standing Rock III, supra note 2, at 130–134. 
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to a place since time immemorial and thus demand a more 
existential analysis.”152 That claim is couched in language that is 
familiar to the international human rights claims that Indigenous 
peoples have been cultivating, which is discussed below.153 For 
his part, Judge Boasberg found that the Tribe “offer[ed] no case 
law, statutory provisions, regulations or other authority to 
support its position that NEPA require[d] such a sweeping 
analysis.”154 Even if Judge Boasberg is complying with federal 
law to uphold the Treaty,155 that level of legality subjects the 
Treaty and the Tribe to domestic regulation, therein reinforcing 
the government-to-subject operation of federal law. 
The court found that the Corps had sufficiently 
considered the Tribe’s Treaty rights, but on a narrower issue, 
“did not adequately consider the impacts of an oil spill on fishing 
rights, hunting rights, or environmental justice, or the degree to 
which the pipeline’s effects are likely to be highly 
controversial.”156 At that time, Judge Boasberg did not rule on 
whether the pipeline must cease operation or what steps the 
Corps must undergo to establish the sufficiency of the EA for 
Lake Oahe.157 The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe argued that 
vacatur was the appropriate remedy, but the court acknowledged 
it had discretion to not vacate an EA if the Corps can substantiate 
its decision on remand.158 With regard to additional consultation 
claims brought by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, Judge 
Boasberg found “that the Corps complied with its statutory 
responsibilities,”159 which is a holding that reduces government-
to-government consultation to a government-to-subject act. 
The second case could be considered another “major 
win” for the Sioux Tribe,160 but it did not end the underlying 
                                                
152 Id. at 131. 
153 See infra Parts IV–V. 
154 Standing Rock III, supra note 2, at 131–132 (“Absent any controlling or 
persuasive authority to the contrary, the Court sees no basis on which to 
conclude that NEPA demands the type of existential-scope analysis the 
Tribe advocates. Rather, it is sufficient that the agency adequately analyze 
impacts on the resource covered by a given treaty.”). 
155 Supra note 58. 
156 Standing Rock III, supra note 2, at 111. 
157 Id.  
158 Id. at 147–148. Later, in October 2017, the Court did not grant vacatur. 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16–1534, 
2017 WL 4564714 *12 (D.D.C. 2017). Judge Boasberg held that vacatur 
was not the appropriate remedy if the Corps could substantiate its prior 
NEPA conclusions. 
159 Standing Rock III, supra note 2, at 160. 
160 Robinson Meyer, The Standing Rock Sioux Claim ‘Victory and 
Vindication’ in Court, THE ATLANTIC (June 14, 2017), 
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political controversy, the territorial dispute. To a limited degree, 
the Sioux Tribe has achieved success in the federal legal system. 
However, in asking the court to adjudicate its claims according 
to the federal legal system, the Sioux Tribe subjects itself to the 
jurisdiction of the court. Even if Judge Boasberg treats all parties 
as equal before the law, he must interpret the Tribe’s Treaties 
according to federal law rather than act as a neutral arbiter 
between two sovereign actors. 
When the Sioux Tribe sought to participate in resolving 
a common problem—how to consult and who has the power to 
participate in permitting the DAPL over disputed territory161—
the federal government and industry actors saw the problem as 
solvable according to federal law162 because federal law 
regulates permitting of those sections of the DAPL. But in using 
federal law to solve the permitting problem, they ignored the 
territorial dispute and therein disregarded the commonality of the 
problem. To the extent the Sioux Tribe maintains that there is a 
common problem to resolve, the Sioux Tribe’s exclusion from 
participating according to its own or a negotiated participatory 
standard has led it to use alternative tools.163 
For these reasons, the Sioux Tribe’s multiple rounds of 
litigation should be viewed from a larger framework of legal 
struggle. Accordingly, the Sioux Tribe’s use of the federal legal 
system can be viewed as a tactical way to delay and perhaps 
destabilize the DAPL by raising expenses. That does not mean it 
is acting in bad-faith or using the legal system in an illegal 
manner. The protest, which was coextensive with the litigation, 
links the federal legal system to the multiple and overlapping 
levels of legality. 
D. The Protest 
Coextensive with the Sioux Tribe’s lawsuit, it 
established protest camps named Sacred Stone Camp and Oceti 
Sakowin to cultivate international attention by occupying 
disputed territories.164 Protesters invoked national and 
                                                
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/06/dakota-access-
standing-rock-sioux-victory-court/530427/ [https://perma.cc/V78A-TL6K]. 
161 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
162 See, e.g., Standing Rock I, supra note 2, at 19, 37; Standing Rock III, 
supra note 2, at 131–132, 160. 
163 Carpenter & Riley, supra note 18, at 177. 
164 Press Release, Indigenous Env’t Network, Indigenous Women Leaders of 
Dakota Access Pipeline Resistance to Speak Out for Protection of Earth and 
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international legal standards, and in doing so, whether 
intentionally or not, formalized networks of opposition. 
In a national media opinion-editorial, Chairman 
Archambault explained the Tribe’s opposition according to 
federal law: 
Although federal law requires the Corps of 
Engineers to consult with the tribe about its 
sovereign interests, permits for the project were 
approved and construction began without 
meaningful consultation. The Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Department of the Interior 
and the National Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation supported more protection of the 
tribe’s cultural heritage, but the Corps of 
Engineers and Energy Transfer Partners turned a 
blind eye to our rights.165 
Scholars have elsewhere discussed the legal meaning of 
“meaningful consultation.”166 It is noteworthy that Chairman 
Archambault used national media to name the Corps and Energy 
Transfer Partners, Dakota Access, LLC’s parent company, as 
part of the name-and-blame aspect of the protest. The Sioux 
Tribe’s members successfully mobilized media attention as part 
of a tactic to destabilize the DAPL project. 
At the international legal level, the Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe decried a failure of the federal government and Dakota 
Access, LLC to consult and seek its consent, as required by the 
1851 and 1868 Treaties and FPIC, and recognized in 
international human rights law.167 Steve Sitting Bear and 
Roberto Borrero wrote, 
                                                
Water, (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.commondreams.org/newswire/ 
2016/09/28/indigenous-women-leaders-dakota-access-pipeline-resistance-
speak-out-protection [https://perma.cc/6BHQ-7MT5]. 
165 David Archambault, Taking a Stand at Standing Rock, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/opinion/taking-a-stand-at-
standing-rock.html?_r=0 (last visited December 05, 2017). 
166 Eitner, supra note 106, at 885–94; Akilah Jenga Kinnison, Indigenous 
Consent: Rethinking U.S. Consultation Policies in Light of the U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1301, 
1322 (2011). 
167 See, e.g., Jeffrey Ostler & Nick Estes, ‘The Supreme Law of the Land’: 
Standing Rock and the Dakota Access Pipeline, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, 
Jan 16, 2017, https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/opinions/ 
supreme-law-land-standing-rock-dakota-access-pipeline/ [https://perma.cc/ 
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[t]he Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the 
International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) jointly 
submitted an urgent action communication to 
four United Nations human rights Special 
Rapporteurs . . . The joint urgent UN 
communication requests the intervention of these 
UN human rights mandate holders to call upon 
the United States to uphold its statutory, legal, 
Treaty and human rights obligations and impose 
an immediate and ongoing moratorium on all 
pipeline construction until Treaty and human 
rights of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 
including their right to free prior and informed 
consent, can be ensured.168 
By invoking international human rights law, the 
protestors drew significant support from actors in nonstate 
regulatory spaces, including U.N. Special Rapporteurs and the 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.169 Between August and 
December 2016, nonstate actors (NSAs) like Cultural Survival, 
Amnesty International, as well as other tribes, began to draw 
attention to the protest through social and conventional media.170 
The Corps enumerated those factors as complicating the DAPL’s 
development, along with factors that would not appear as legal 
acts, such as visits by “Hollywood A-Listers,” like Jesse 
Jackson, and over a million Facebook “Check-In’s” at the 
Standing Rock Sioux.171 The Sioux Tribe’s ability to cultivate 
                                                
KBP9-JDCL]; Linda Ferrer, Standing Rock Sioux Defend Their Water, 
Lands, in Fight Against Dakota Access Pipeline, CULTURAL SURVIVAL, 
Aug. 29, 2016, https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/standing-rock-sioux-
defend-their-water-lands-fight-against-dakota-access-pipeline [https:// 
perma.cc/GR3D-3WG4]; Maria Ramos, Standing with Standing Rock, 
OXFAM, Nov. 1, 2016, http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2016/11/ 
standing-with-standing-rock/ [https://perma.cc/RW7W-3DFA]; Press 
Release, Amnesty Int’l U.S., Halting DAPL Should be Just the First Step in 




168 Sitting Bear & Borrero, supra note 5 (emphasis added). 
169 Infra section V.D. 
170 Infra section V.C. 
171 Decl. William S. Scherman Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. B, U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs Information Package, Dakota Access Pipelines (DAPL) 
USACE Information Package (Nov. 7, 2016) at 9, Standing Rock I, supra 
note 2 [Hereinafter USACE Info Package]. 
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support from NSAs and to use social media fueled significant 
global interest in the protest. 
In December 2016, friction between protestors and 
police increased, resulting in violence and arrests.172 The 
protestors blamed the police for unnecessary use of violence, 
while the police blamed the protesters for inciting violence.173 
Concerned with allegations of human rights abuses, the U.N. and 
Amnesty International sent human right monitors to Standing 
Rock.174 In response to violence, Colonel Henderson announced 
the creation of “free speech zones” to move the protest site away 
from the pipeline construction area, ostensibly an area that would 
protect the protestors.175 He claimed the move was to “protect 
the general public from violent confrontations between 
protesters and law enforcement officials that have occurred in 
this area, and to prevent death, illness, or serious injury to 
inhabitants of encampments due to the harsh North Dakota 
winter conditions.”176 Colonel Henderson announced that 
anyone remaining at the protest site on December 5, 2016, would 
be considered a trespasser, arrested, and prosecuted.177 
Chairman Archambault responded that the tribe was 
“deeply disappointed” but provided no indication whether the 
Tribe would comply with Henderson’s mandate.178 On 
December 4, 2016, amid increasing international pressure and no 
sign that the Sioux Tribe or its supporters intended to comply 
with the mandate, the Corps announced they would engage in an 
                                                
172 Julia Carrie Wong, Standing Rock protest: hundreds clash with police 
over Dakota Access Pipeline, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2016), https:// 
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/21/standing-rock-protest-
hundreds-clash-with-police-over-dakota-access-pipeline [https://perma.cc/ 
59U8-PXDY]; Michael McLaughlin, Dakota Access Pipeline Standoff 
Lapses into Violence, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www. 
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http://www.attn.com/stories/12983/police-use-force-against-standing-rock-
protestors [https://perma.cc/536P-7UU2]. 
174 See infra note 285; Press Release, Amnesty Int’l U.S., infra note 260. 
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EIS under NEPA to consider the viability of alternative routes 
for the pipeline.179 Although media outlets hailed the 
announcement as a “major win” and a “victory” for the Standing 
Rock Sioux Tribe.180 The enthusiasm was short-lived as 
President Trump directed the Corps to review and reconsider the 
feasibility of the original EA and Dakota Access, LLC’s original 
plan for the DAPL.181 
In protesting the DAPL, the Sioux Tribe has established 
important precedent which cannot be found in United States 
courts. Instead, its United States-based legal strategy and protest 
worked towards formalizing networks in global spaces for 
operating Indigenous peoples’ FPIC.182 The next sections will 
consider how the Sioux Tribe invoked FPIC, which may prevent 
the DAPL from continuing to operate. Under this view, the Sioux 
Tribe’s suits under national law delay and increase costs, and, as 
examined below, encouraged international finance institutions 
(IFIs) to divest from the DAPL. The delay-and-divestment 
strategy may, in time, destabilize plans to continue operating the 
DAPL by shifting investment away from fossil fuels. The Sioux 
Tribe’s actions suggest that natural resource developers can no 
longer ignore Indigenous peoples and their intercommunal 
networks, which have created and are invoking FPIC. 
IV. INTRODUCTION TO FREE, PRIOR,  
      AND INFORMED CONSENT 
The basic idea of FPIC is that states should seek 
Indigenous consent before taking actions that will impact them, 
their territories, or their livelihoods.183 Several articles of the 
UNDRIP, a human rights instrument endorsed by the U.N. 
General Assembly and all member states, including the United 
States, recognize FPIC.184 The U.N. Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues defined FPIC as: 
                                                
179 See supra note 140.  
180 Healy & Nicholas, supra note 147. 
181 Trump Memo, supra note 20. 
182 See, e.g., Sitting Bear & Borrero, supra note 5, at 1. 
183 See, e.g., Adrienne McKeehan & Theresa Buppert, Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent: Empowering Communities for People-Focused 
Conservation, 25(3) HARV. INT’L REV. (2014), http://hir.harvard.edu/ 
article/?a=5677 [https://perma.cc/449M-TL3A]. 
184 The General Assembly endorsed UNDRIP in 2007. UNDRIP, supra note 
24. At that time, the United States did not endorse it, citing concerns that 
FPIC would provide Indigenous peoples with a “veto power” and was 
antidemocratic. See supra note 26. The United States reversed its decision 
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• Free should imply no coercion, intimidation 
or manipulation. 
• Prior should imply that consent has been 
sought sufficiently in advance of any 
authorization or commencement of activities 
and that respect is shown for time 
requirements of the process. 
• Informed should imply that information is 
provided that covers (at least): the nature, 
size, pace, reversibility and scope of any 
proposed project and/or activity; the reason(s) 
for or purpose(s) of the project and/or 
activity; the duration of the above; the locality 
of areas that will be affected; a preliminary 
assessment of the likely economic, social, 
cultural and environmental impact, including 
potential risks and fair and equitable benefit-
sharing in a context that respects the 
precautionary principles; personnel likely to 
be involved in the execution of the proposed 
project (including indigenous peoples, private 
sector staff, research institutions, government 
employees, and others); and procedures that 
the project may entail. 
• Consent.185 
FPIC requires an exchange and understanding of 
significant information, and the Indigenous community must 
consent before the proposed action may commence. Nicholas 
Fromherz, when comparing FPIC to federal consultation laws, 
has argued that federal consultation provisions under NEPA fall 
short of meeting an FPIC standard.186 Similarly, Akilah 
                                                
and endorsed UNDRIP in 2009. Anaya & Puig, supra note 90, at 14 (seeing 
the “veto power” as a challenge to the classical liberal framework because it 
is counter-majoritarian, at least as articulated in the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights); also Promotion and Protection, supra note 26, ¶ 48; Lisa J. 
Laplante & Suzanne A. Spears, Out of the conflict zone: the case for 
community consent processes in the extractive sector, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. 
& DEV. L J. 69, 87–97 (2008). 
185 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 
Report on the International Workshop on Methodologies regarding Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.19/2005/3 (17 February 2005). 
186 Nicholas A. Fromherz, From Consultation to Consent: Community 
Approval as a Prerequisite to Environmentally Significant Projects 116 W. 
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Kinnison points out that Executive Order 13,175’s meaningful 
consultation standard does not guarantee that Native Americans 
can provide or withhold their consent.187 As an international 
human rights standard, FPIC suggests that if Indigenous peoples 
do not consent, then the project should not go forward even if 
national laws allow it.188 But, as commonly understood, FPIC 
has two problems. 
A. FPIC’s Definition 
First, there is an ongoing debate over the meaning of 
FPIC.189 The confusion results from trying to “operationalize” 
FPIC as a top-down style of legality. Robert T. Coulter charges 
that it “is so poorly defined (or not defined at all) that it is 
                                                
VA. L. REV.110, 113–14 (2013) (He does not advocate for FPIC to become 
the standard for all Indigenous participation in every situation, but rather 
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187 Kinnison, supra note 166, at 1331. 
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Anaya & Puig, supra note 90, at 2, 7, 13–14, 18–19 (analyzing the argument 
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but less than the right of veto”); Emma Barry-Pheby, Examining the 
Priorities of the Canadian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council: Current 
Obstacles in Internationa Law, Policy and Governance, 25(2) COLO. NAT. 
RES., ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 259, 273 (2014) (equating consent with a 
veto-power); Catherine J. Iorns-Magallanes, Indigenous Rights and 
Democratic Rights in International Law: an “Uncomfortable Fit”?, 15 
U.C.L.A. J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 111, 133, 140, 182 (2010) (equating 
consent with a veto power); Kinnison, supra note 166, at 1304, 1326-32 
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situations and consent in others); Jo M. Pasqualucci, International 
Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of the Inter-American Jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Light of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples, 27 WIS. INT’L L. J. 51, 87-
88 (2009) (assuming a right to say no is a veto); Shalanda H. Baker, Why the 
IFC’s Free, Prior andInformed Consent Policy does not matter (yet) to 
indigenous communities affected by development projects, 30 WIS. INT’L L. 
J. 668, 687–88 (2012) (arguing that a broad reading could provide a needed 
veto, but it is unlikely to be provided); Carol Y. Verbeek, Free, Prior, 
Informed Consent: the key to self-determination: an analysis of the Kichwa 
people of Sarayaku v Ecuador, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 263, 265, 280 (2012–
13) (stating that a veto is integral to Indigenous self-determination); Martha 
Macintyre, Informed Consent and Mining Projects: A View for Papua New 
Guinea, 80(1) PAC. AFF. 49 (2007) (arguing that the notion of a veto ignores 
economic dimensions); Promotion and Protection, supra note 26, ¶ 48 
(concluding that FPIC does not provide “veto power” but rather establishes 
the need to frame consultation procedures in order to make every effort to 
build consensus on the part of all concerned). 
189 See, e.g., Coulter, supra note 27, at 2. 
 206 
practically useless.”190 The U.N. Expert Mechanism on the Right 
of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP), which completed a two-year 
study on Indigenous participation, demonstrates this confusion. 
The EMRIP study stated, “[a]lthough a relatively new concept 
internationally, free, prior and informed consent is one of the 
most important principles, as a right, that Indigenous peoples 
believe can further protect their right to participation.”191 
EMRIP’s statement belies incredible complexity and confusion 
from a strict legalistic perspective. For instance, one might see 
FPIC as a “most important principle” that guides the 
interpretation of a legally operable right. Or it might be “right” 
with correlative duties and obligations if applied as a rule of law. 
Or it might be a principle or a right used to protect a “further . . 
. right to participation,”192 which is a confusing mixture of right 
and animating principle. Additionally, EMRIP’s phrasing 
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Castillo, The Law is not Enough: Protecting Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
Against Mining Interests in the Philippines, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 
CONSENT AND BENEFIT SHARING: LESSONS FROM THE SAN HOODIA CASE 
271, 272-3 (R Wynberg, D. Schoreder & R Chennells, eds., 2009); contra 
CATHAL DOYLE, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TITLE TO TERRITORY, RIGHTS AND 
RESOURCES: THE TRANSFORMATIVE ROLE OF FREE PRIOR AND INFORMED 
CONSENT 195, 248 (2015) (viewing it as a “high water mark[] in terms of 
recognition of the consent requirement in the context of extractive 
activities”). Doyle also upholds Australia’s Native Title Act for affirming a 
right to negotiate as evidence of movement towards an FPIC standard. As 
evidence, he cites the 2009 Native Title Tribunal arbitration as an example 
of providing Aboriginal Peoples the right to “say no to development and to 
expect that considerable weight would be given to their view about the use 
of the land in the context of all the circumstances projects.” Id. at 197, citing 
Western Desert Lands Aboriginal Corporation (Jamukurnu-
Yapalikunu)/Western Australia/Holocene Pty Ltd [2009] NNTTA 49, 27 
May 2009, ¶ 215. While Holocene did find in favor of the Aboriginal group 
in question, this case is only one of three to find in favor of Indigenous 
peoples and based the holding on weighing the economic benefit and the 
impact on Indigenous peoples and not on the self-determined ability to say 
no. 
191 U.N. Human Rights Council, Final Report of the Study on Indigenous 
Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-Making: Report of the 
Expert Mechanism on the Right of Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 63, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/18/42 (Aug. 17, 2011). 
192 Id. 
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suggests that even if “Indigenous peoples believe” in it, others 
may not. 
From a strict legalistic approach it is not clear if FPIC is 
a right, a principle, or perhaps something else, such as a process 
that enables Indigenous peoples to give or withhold consent. If 
it is not clear what FPIC is, as a right to be claimed or a process 
the State is supposed to institute, then it is not clear how it is 
supposed to “operate” or be put into practice.193 The conceptual 
confusion leads Coulter to conclude that FPIC is little more than 
“a noun with redundant intensifiers.”194 To be sure, FPIC’s 
definitional imprecision signifies that it is soft law.195 According 
to the problem-solving approach in global spaces, FPIC’s soft 
legal status is not detrimental to its operation. 
Despite the inability to precisely parse FPIC’s legal 
definition, excitement over FPIC stems from the U.N. General 
Assembly’s endorsement of UNDRIP, which explicitly ties 
FPIC to Indigenous peoples’ right of self-determination.196 
EMRIP reflects this when it writes that FPIC “needs to be 
understood in the context of Indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination because it is an integral element of that right.”197 
When connected to self-determination, FPIC appears to provide 
Indigenous peoples with the ability to choose how non-
                                                
193 The language of “operating” or “operationalizing” FPIC has become 
somewhat commonplace but also something of a term of art. I believe the 
notion of “operating” or “operationalizing” was introduced in Pekka Aikio 
& Martin Scheinin (eds), OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION (2000). To see scholarship no operating 
FPIC, see David Szablowski, Operationalizing Free, Prior, and Informed 
Consent in the Extractive Industry Sector? Examining the Challenges of a 
Negotiated Model of Justice, 30 CAN J. DEV. STUDS. 111, 112–13 (2010); 
Laplante & Spears, supra note 184, 71, 87–97.  
194 Coulter, supra note 27, at 1. 
195 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in 
International Governance, 54(3) INT’L ORG. 421, 424 (2000) (arguing that 
hard law exhibits high levels, while soft law exhibits low levels of precision, 
obligation and delegation). 
196 See, e.g., Cathal Doyle & Jérémie Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples and 
Globalization: From Development Aggression to Self-Determined 
Development, 78 EUR. Y.B. MINORITY ISSUES 219, 245–48 (2009) 
(“UNDRIP highlights the indivisibility of the concepts of FPIC and self-
determined development and the fact that they are, in many regards, two 
sides of the same coin.”); Carpenter & Riley, supra note 18, at 189–91. 
197 Final Report of the Study on Indigenous Peoples and the Right to 
Participate in Decision-Making: Report of the Expert Mechanism on the 
Right of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 191, annex ¶ 20; DOYLE, supra 
note 190, at 134–35 (viewing the “free, prior and informed” elements as 
safeguards of consent, based upon and used to actualize rights of self-
determination, culture, and territory. Under this view “free, prior and 
informed” seems to modify as well as identify “consent.”). 
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Indigenous decisions will influence them, make choices about 
how to self-govern, develop, and otherwise exist. Oxfam’s 
guidebook for Indigenous peoples and FPIC states that it “relates 
directly to the right for Indigenous Peoples to control their own 
future and the future of their people. It has been stated as the 
right to give or withhold free, prior and informed consent to 
actions that affect their lands, territories and natural 
resources.”198 If FPIC is a mechanism for Indigenous peoples to 
control their futures, it may be an important and transformative 
concept for them, sustainable development, and settler-state 
economies that rely on the extractive industries.199 The question 
remains: even if FPIC is a mechanism for Indigenous self-
determination, what obligates states to seek Indigenous 
consent?200 
B. FPIC’s Obligation? 
The second problem with FPIC is that states, like the 
United States, view UNDRIP, arguably the most authoritative 
instrument containing FPIC,201 as a nonbinding, aspirational 
document.202 From a strict legalistic approach, this softer status 
results in an anxious search for obligatory authority.203 There 
have been several attempts in international law to bypass FPIC’s 
lack of obligation and claim that it is “required.” For instance, 
Cathal Doyle points out that FPIC is grounded in Indigenous 
peoples’ own legal histories and human rights so that if states 
recognize that Indigenous peoples have their own legality, then 
FPIC is required.204 Claire Charters has argued that the multiple 
                                                
198 CHRISTINA HILL ET AL., GUIDE TO FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT, 
OXFAM AUSTRALIA 2 (2010), http://www.culturalsurvival.org/sites/default/ 
files/guidetofreepriorinformedconsent_0.pdf (internal citations removed). 
199 DOYLE, supra note 190, at 262. 
200 McKeehan & Buppert, supra note 183. 
201 FPIC is in other instruments, even binding instruments such as Int’l 
Labour Organization Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous & 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, art. 16(2), June 27, 1989 (entered 
into force Sept. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Convention No. 169]. The United 
States has not signed or ratified any treaty documents containing 
contemporary iterations of FPIC. The 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty art. XII, 
supra note 47, contains a consent provision, which is not technically an 
FPIC provision. 
202 See supra note 26. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 195, at 423 (discussing 
that soft law exhibits lower levels of obligation, precision, and delegation). 
203 See, e.g., Megan Davis, To Bind or Not to Bind: The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Five Years On, 19 AUSTL. 
INT’L L.J. 19–20, 24, 37 (2012). 
204 DOYLE, supra note 190, at 6. 
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sources of Indigenous norms, perhaps like FPIC, generate 
legitimacy under international law.205 Approaches that attempt 
to demonstrate FPIC’s legitimacy are bids to increase the 
perceptions of FPIC’s obligation. Increasing FPIC’s obligation 
and definitional precision might make FPIC function as “harder” 
legality, but doing so is implicitly committed to a legal 
positivistic epistemology. If FPIC becomes treated as “hard 
law,” then state actors may operate it according to state law, 
similar to how Judge Boasberg oriented the Sioux Tribe’s Treaty 
rights within domestic law.206 
The following largely comports with both Doyle and 
Charters’ views that Indigenous peoples have used their 
influence to gain adoption of FPIC in many sources. However, 
here, FPIC is oriented in a discussion about legality and global 
spaces. If one desires to operate FPIC as a nation-state legal rule, 
as a “top-down control using fixed statutes, detailed rules, and 
judicial enforcement”207 style of law, then a concern with FPIC’s 
precision or obligation is well founded. However, if states adopt 
FPIC as a harder form of legality, then other state laws, 
interpretations, or memos may conflict or override it when 
judges treat it as domestic law.208 A failure to consider how 
Indigenous peoples are operating FPIC in a global space 
overlooks novel, nonstate-based approaches to legal practice. 
V. FPIC AND GLOBAL LAW 
This section introduces William Twining’s framework of 
global law,209 which aids in mapping the multiple and 
overlapping levels of legality implicated by the Sioux Tribe’s 
invocation of FPIC. The framework enables a mapping of FPIC 
                                                
205 Claire Charters, Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms and the Legitimacy of 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights under International Law in MULTI-SOURCED 
EQUIVALENT NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 298–99, 303–19 (Tomer 
Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2011); Anaya SJ, The Emergence of 
Customary International Law concerning the Right of Indigenous Peoples, 
12 L. & Anthropology 127, 127–29 (2005) (“international institutions have 
generated “a consensus on core principles of indigenous peoples’ rights,” 
which is not to say that it is “entirely satisfactory or that there is sufficient 
commitment by authoritative actors to implementing that consensus.”). 
206 Standing Rock III, supra note 2, at 131. 
207 Trubek & Trubek, supra note 13, at 543. 
208 Standing Rock III, supra note 2, at 131.  
209 William Twining, Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective, 
20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 473, 505–06 (2010) [hereinafter Normative 
and Legal Pluralism]; see also SANTOS, NEW COMMON SENSE, supra note 
11 at 89–90. I generally refer to Twining’s work, but Santos is owed 
significant credit. 
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at the nonstate, intercommunal, international human rights, 
regional, and transnational levels, which works in conjunction 
with but exceeds national law and the human rights discourse. 
So even if FPIC is soft law, the problem-solving approach allows 
the Sioux Tribe to operate FPIC as a softer legality in global 
spaces.210 Cottrell and Trubek see law as promoting a normative 
ordering, allowing disparate actors to coordinate their behavior 
and solve common problems.211 According to them, rather than 
“harder” or top-down legal enforcement that some commonly 
associate with national levels of legality, disparate actors operate 
soft law by stabilizing norms—to some degree—through 
common agreement, which they enforce through peer 
pressure.212 
The Sioux Tribe’s operation of FPIC according to the 
problem-solving approach avoids the need to search for precise 
legal definition or harder obligating force.213 Social connections 
among participants and communities exert peer pressure on each 
other, which is observable between industry, states, NSAs, and 
intercommunal networks as described below.214 However, peer 
pressure is not always an adequate means for solving problems. 
According to Cottrell and Trubek, “suasion, the potential for 
public embarrassment and reputation costs are not enough, there 
are other means to retain quality participation.”215 For Cottrell 
and Trubek, “other means” are “destabilizing acts.”216 The Sioux 
Tribe is pressuring IFIs and others to divest from the project, 
which is a tactic that may destabilize the DAPL and engender 
                                                
210 See Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12, at 367. 
211 Id. at 367. 
212 Nation-state legality also involves the problem-solving approach in some 
contexts. See Trubek & Trubek, supra note 13, at 540–41, 547–48. 
213 Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12, at 374; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 
195, at 423. 
214 Members of the Wangan and Jagalingou Family Council have travelled 
to the U.K. to oppose banks funding the Carmichael Coal Mine. Jennifer 
Rankin, Indigenous Australians call on Standard Chartered not to fund coal 
mine project, THE GUARDIAN (June 13, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/12/indigenous-
australians-wangan-jagalingou-standard-chartered-coal-mine-meeting 
[http://perma.cc/8BDE-Z7DT]; similarly, the San Carlos Apache are 
marching and protesting the Resolution Mine. Carina Dominguez, San 




215 Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12, at 374. 
216 Id. 
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long-term repercussions for the viability of the fossil fuel 
industry. 
A. The Levels of Legality 
Mapping the multiple levels of legality helps understand 
how legal practice is changing because of globalization.217 
Twining’s goal is to describe how globalization altered legal 
practice so jurists can respond to the challenges they face.218 For 
him, the idea of state-centric legal monism is a recent 
phenomenon, one that many influential global actors—like state 
actors—do not recognize.219 For Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 
another theorist of globalization and law, globalization has 
allowed us to rediscover that law, which some primarily think of 
as state law, is interconnected and shot through with 
supranational and local legal forces.220 Santos’s theorization of 
oppositional hegemonic projects are particularly appropriate for 
discussing Indigenous peoples’ activism involving multifaceted 
legal approaches.221 Although Twining and Santos have 
                                                
217 SANTOS, NEW COMMON SENSE, supra note 11, at 85–98; TWINING, 
GLOBALISATION, supra note 28, at 195; Twining, Normative and Legal 
Pluralism, supra note 209, at 489. This article does not discuss whether the 
extralegal levels of legality are law or are merely “law-like,” i.e., some 
novel assemblage of normative ordering. See, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 
Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law, 
14(3) J.L. & SOC’Y 279, 281–82, 298 (1987). 
218 TWINING, GLOBALISATION, supra note 28, at 195. 
219 Twining, Normative and Legal Pluralism, supra note 209, at 489 (“Legal 
pluralism is not new. Indeed, from the perspective of world history, the near 
monopoly of coercive power by a centralized bureaucratic state is a modern 
exception, largely confined to the northern hemisphere for less than 200 
years.”). I am not addressing whether legal pluralism means the coexistence 
of multiple legal orders in the same time-space context or the recognition of 
different legal traditions and sources of law within a single legal system. 
TWINING, GLOBALISATION, supra note 28, at 216, 82–88. 
220 SANTOS, NEW COMMON SENSE, supra note 11, at 85. 
221 Id. at 243–45; also Megan Davis, Indigenous Struggles in Standard-
Setting: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, 9 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1, 17 (2008); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, 
Erica-Irene A Daes (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples), Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, Prevention of 
Discrimination & Prot. of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/sub/2/2004/30 (13 July 2004); Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Hybrid 
State-Corporate Enterprise and Violations of Indigenous Land Rights: 
Theorizing Corporate Responsibility and Accountability Under 
International Law, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 135, 168–82 (2011); Lillian 
Aponte Miranda, The Role of International Law in Intrastate Natural 
Resource Allocation: Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Peoples-Based 
Development, 45 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 785, 830–39 (2012). 
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drastically different projects,222 both of their notions of global 
law are akin to Cottrell and Trubek’s idea, “multiple overlapping 
legal orders that transcend conventional state boundaries.”223 
This article primarily relies upon Twining’s map to articulate 
how FPIC has developed as more than a human rights norm, 
while Cottrell and Trubek’s problem-solving approach helps 
explain how the Sioux Tribe is operating it. Twining defines 
some levels like this:  
 
Twining’s Levels of Legality224 
International (in the classic sense of relations between 
sovereign states and more broadly relations governed, for 
example, by human rights or refugee law) 
Regional (for example, the European Union, the European 
Convention on Human Rights, and the Organization of 
African Unity) 
Transnational (for example, Islamic, Hindu, Jewish law, 
Gypsy law, transnational arbitration, a putative lex 
mercatoria, Internet law, and more controversially, the 
internal governance of multinational corporations, the 
Catholic Church, or institutions of organized crime) 
Intercommunal (as in relations between religious 
communities, or Christian Churches, or different ethnic 
groups) 
Municipal state (including the legal systems of nation 
states, and subnational jurisdictions, such as Florida, 
Greenland, Quebec, and Northern Ireland) 
Nonstate (including laws of subordinated peoples, such as 
native North Americans, or Maoris, or gypsies or illegal 
legal orders such as Santos’s Pasagarda law, the Southern 
People’s Liberation Army’s legal regime of Southern Sudan, 
and the “common law movement” of militias in the United 
States)225 
 
                                                
222 Twining’s goal is to provide a pluralistic version to better understand the 
effects of legality in global society. Santos is interested in developing an 
oppositional or subaltern cosmopolitan legality to global capitalism. NEW 
COMMON SENSE, supra note 11, 21–84. 
223 Cottrell & Trubek, supra note 12, 362. 
224 TWINING, GLOBALISATION, supra note 28, at 139; Twining, Normative 
and Legal Pluralism, supra note 209, at 505–06. Twining’s “global” and 
“sub-state” levels are not included because they are not discussed below. 
Twining also generates a map of Santos’s levels of laws. 
225 See SANTOS, NEW COMMON SENSE, supra note 11, 237–57. 
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This framework presents an overview of some levels of 
law that exist globally. It assists in articulating how FPIC 
developed throughout multiple levels rather than as merely a 
human rights concept.226 The following is not an exhaustive list 
of all extranational levels of legality, nor is it an exhaustive list 
of all sources of FPIC.227 It is one way of describing the creation 
and dispersal of FPIC throughout multiple extranational levels, 
which the Sioux Tribe is operating according to the problem-
solving approch to oppose the DAPL. 
B. The Nonstate Level of Legality 
The nonstate level includes the “law of subordinated 
peoples, such as native North Americans or Maoris.”228 Native 
Americans, and those commonly called Indigenous peoples have 
sui generis legal systems.229 In the Aboriginal Australian 
context, Irene Watson succinctly describes this level, what she 
calls “Raw Law,” as a “natural system of obligations and 
benefits, flowing from an Aboriginal ontology.”230 Other 
                                                
226 DOYLE, supra note 190, at 5–6, 15; also CATHAL M. DOYLE & ANDREW 
WHITMORE, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE EXTRACTIVE SECTOR, TOWARDS 
A RIGHTS-RESPECTIVE ENGAGEMENT 53–57 (2014), 
http://www.piplinks.org/system/files/IPs-and-the-Extractive-Sector-
Towards-a-Rights-Respecting-Engagement.pdf. Like Doyle, I argue that 
FPIC is concept found in Indigenous peoples’ sui generis legality and that 
the other levels are becoming important. 
227 DOYLE, supra note 190, at 5 (claiming that FPIC has re-emerged in 
international human rights but has a foundation in precontact Indigenous 
society); but cf., Laurel A. Firestone, You Say Yes, I say No; Defining 
Community Prior Informed Consent under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 171, 181–85 (2003-04) (examining 
the “foundations” of FPIC in the Convention on Biological Diversity); AMY 
K LEHR & GARE A SMITH, IMPLEMENTING A CORPORATE FREE, PRIOR AND 
INFORMED CONSENT POLICY, BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES 10 (2010), 
http://www.foleyhoag.com/publications/ebooks-and-white-papers?page=3; 
Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Antoanella-Iulia 
Motoc & Tebtebba Foundation, Standard-Setting: Legal Commentary on the 
Concept of Free, Prior Informed Consent 6 (July 2005), 
www2.ohchr.org/English/issues/indigenous/docs/wgip23/WP1.doc; Anne 
Perrault, Prior Informed Consent: Facilitating Prior Informed Consent in 
the Context of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, 4 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 21, 21 (Summer 2004). 
228 TWINING, GLOBALISATION, supra note 28, at 139; Twining, Normative 
and Legal Pluralism, supra note 209, at 505–06. I do not endorse the view 
that these nonstate levels of legality are necessarily “subordinated,” 
although they appear subordinated by States in many contexts. 
229 See, e.g., Background on the DAPL, supra note 3. 
230 IRENE WATSON, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, COLONIALISM AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: RAW LAW 5 (2015); also Greg Lehman, A snake and 
a Seal, in HEARTSICK FOR COUNTRY: STORIES OF LOVE, SPIRIT AND 
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Indigenous scholars from around the world similarly argue that 
their legal systems continue to animate their ways of living.231 
Indigenous peoples’ sui generis legal systems are sophisticated 
and sometimes appear radical or contentious to people and 
lawyers operating under national-monist legal epistemologies.232 
However, there is little doubt that many Indigenous communities 
are legally responsible for territories, ancestors, and peoples.233 
When Indigenous peoples, who have responsibilities according 
to their legal systems, conflict with industry actors, which have 
countervailing legal responsibilities, one might think it is a clash 
of cultures. 
However, when tribes use the state-based legal regimes, 
such as the Sioux Tribe’s legal claims under NHPA and NEPA 
against the Corps and Dakota Access, LLC, there is a power 
imbalance implicit at that legal level. Historically, states sanction 
industry actors, like Dakota Access, LLC, while simultaneously 
relegating and regulating tribal law as “culture” or something 
even less than that. Even if tribes occasionally win when using 
state law, say by forcing the Corps to substantiate its position on 
the adequacy of a NEPA EA, using state law requires subjection 
to the State, which may be what they are striving to challenge. 
Occasionally, the fact that Indigenous peoples have sui 
generis legal systems is obscured by the language tribal 
members or Indigenous peoples employ. For instance, some 
Indigenous peoples have articulated a right or interest in “self-
determination,” which has given rise to an impressive amount of 
interest in Indigenous self-determination.234 The treatment of 
                                                
CREATION 135 (Sally Morgan, Tjalaminu Mia & Black Kwaymullina eds., 
2008) cited in BIRRELL, supra note 24, at 47. 
231 See, e.g., LEANNE SIMPSON, DANCING ON OUR TURTLE’S BACK 11–13 
(2011); TAIAIAKE ALFRED, PEACE, POWER, RIGHTEOUSNESS: AN 
INDIGENOUS MANIFESTO 41–46 (1999). 
232 WATSON, supra note 230, at 5–7. 
233 See Int’l Indian Treaty Council, Statement Submitted to the WGIP, 2, 1st 
Sess., Geneva, 1982 [doCip Archives, CD 1] cited by Jacklyn Hartley, 
Constructing a Contextual Model of Indigenous Participation in Decision-
Making: A Comparative Analysis 60 (February 2016) (unpublished PhD 
Dissertation, University of New South Wales) (on file with the author) 
(“Land, for the Indigenous, is not a commercial matter. We consider the 
land to be geographically, economically and culturally a collective, sacred 
space in which a people or nation live, not only for themselves in their own 
time, but for the future generations . . . The cultures and religions of the 
Indigenous are linked integrally with the Land, and because of this, when a 
group, people, or nation loses a part of their ancestral territory, it is a part of 
life itself that is lost.”). 
234 There are many iterations and competing views of self-determination, 
especially as it pertains to Indigenous peoples. See, e.g., Ward Churchill, A 
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Indigenous peoples’ self-determination as a right/principle 
codified in international human rights law235 elides the fact that 
many Indigenous peoples have struggled for the ability to self-
rule and self-govern for hundreds of years before self-
determination was codified in international law or human 
rights.236 
Accordingly, it should also be acknowledged that 
Indigenous peoples’ self-determination is not just a human right 
and there may be an uneasy translation from Tribal, Aboriginal, 
or Indigenous peoples’ legal systems into rights-based analysis 
or vice versa. Failure to appreciate problems with translation 
may limit how others understand what Indigenous peoples’ mean 
when they claim “self-determination” or any other rights for that 
matter.237 It may be that self-determination or any correlative 
                                                
Travesty of a Mockery of a Sham: Colonialism as ‘Self-Determination’ in 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 20(3) GRIFFITH L. 
REV. 526–56 (2011); James Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples to 
Self-Determination in the Post-Declaration Era, in MAKING THE 
DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS 
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 
2009) [hereinafter MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK]; Mauro Barelli, 
Shaping Indigenous Self Determination: Promising or Unsatisfactory 
Solutions?, 13(4) INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 413 (2011); Alexandra 
Xanthaki, The Right to Self-Determination: Meaning and Scope, in 
MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION 15–34 (Nazila Ghanea & 
Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2005); Malcolm N. Shaw, Self-Determination and 
the Use of Force, in MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION 35–
54 (2005); Joshua Castellino, Conceptual Difficulties and the Right to 
Indigenous Self-Determination, in MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND SELF-
DETERMINATION 55–74 (2005); R. S. Bhalla, The Right of Self-
Determination in International Law, in ISSUES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
100 (William Twining ed., 1991); KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-
DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002); JOSHUA CASTELLINO, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE INTERPLAY OF THE 
POLITICS OF TERRITORIAL POSSESSION WITH FORMULATIONS OF POST-
COLONIAL NATIONAL IDENTITY 55 (2000). 
235 Int’l Covenant on Civil & Political Rights art. 1, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Int’l Covenant on 
Economic, Social & Cultural Rights art. 1, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). 
236 DOYLE, supra note 190, at 14–17 (positing a natural law basis for 
Indigenous peoples’ rights). Some Indigenous leaders have voiced concerns 
“about attempts to limits the concept of self-determination to the conduct of 
internal affairs . . .  [because it] was not primarily a post-Second World War 
concept but had existed since time immemorial and was not dependent 
exclusively on international law for its understanding”. Erica-Irene A Daes, 
The Contribution of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations to the 
Genesis and Evolution of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK, supra note 234, at 69.  
237 KNOP, supra note 234, at 360–72 (discussing the interpretations given to 
Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, GAOR, 36th Sess, Supp No. 40, U.N. Doc. 
A/36/40 (1981)). 
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rights are convenient legal-linguistic phrasing used to appeal to 
legalistic sensibilities that represent more complex desires and 
struggles for self-governance, control, or power.238 
The Sioux Tribe’s opposition to the DAPL relies upon a 
sui generis level of legality.239 When the Sioux Tribes claims 
Treaty rights to “demand a more existential analysis,”240 it stands 
as a reminder of the Sioux Tribe’s sovereign status with an 
independent, sui generis legal system.241 Thus, the Sioux Tribe’s 
use of the federal legal system and the invocation of international 
human rights to oppose the DAPL involves sui generis law as 
one of several overlapping levels of legality. 
C. The Intercommunal Level of Legality 
The intercommunal level of legality develops between 
“religious communities, or Christian Churches, or different 
ethnic groups.”242 Each tribe may have sui generis laws. When 
tribes work together, they create intercommunal legality. The 
most notable intercommunal legality that involves the Standing 
Rock Sioux Tribe is, perhaps, the International Indian Treaty 
Council (IITC). The IITC has recently advocated on behalf of 
the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe,243 and it is not surprising 
considering the IITC’s historical formation. In 1974, 
representatives from tribes scattered throughout the Americas 
met on Standing Rock Sioux Reservation lands—the same lands 
the Sioux Tribe seeks to protect by opposing the DAPL—and 
formed the IITC.244 Immediately after its creation, the IITC 
adopted the Declaration of Continuing Independence. The 
Declaration may not have legal status under U.S. federal law, but 
under inter-Indian law, it is a Declaration that charges the United 
States with gross legal and moral violations, including 
“wrongfully taking” the Black Hills from the Great Sioux 
Nation.245 It also articulated an inter-Indian commitment to a 
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unified legal and political struggle, which the IITC would help 
disperse through the international, regional, and transnational 
legal levels. 
In 1977, the IITC assisted in creating the Non-
Governmental Organization Conference on Discrimination 
against Indigenous Populations, a group comprised of Indian 
leaders from the Americas.246 That NGO met at the U.N. 
headquarters and created the Draft Declaration of Principles for 
the Defence of Indigenous Nations and Peoples of the Western 
Hemisphere, which was a formal method of asking—if not 
demanding—the U.N. prepare a similar declaration for all 
Indigenous peoples.247 In 1982, U.N. Economic and Social 
Council authorized the establishment of the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations (WGIP).248 In 1983, the IITC introduced 
the language of free, prior, and informed consent to the WGIP.249 
Shortly afterwards, the WGIP decided to draft a U.N. instrument 
to recognize and set standards for Indigenous peoples’ rights in 
a formal manner.250 Over the following twenty years, the WGIP 
and later the Working Group on the Draft Declaration debated 
the draft, which culminated in the General Assembly’s 
                                                
246 Int’l Indian Treaty Council, International NGO Conference on 
Discrimination against Indigenous Populations in the Americas, Sept. 20–
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250 Daes, supra note 236, at 49 (noting that a Declaration of Principles was 
adopted by the World Council of Indigenous Peoples in Panama in 
September 1984 and a Declaration of Principles was submitted to the fourth 
session of the WGIP by the Indian Law Resource Center); Rep. of the 
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endorsement of UNDRIP in 2007.251 Although UNDRIP is an 
international human rights standard at the international level of 
legality that some commentators see as not creating special 
rights because it does not create any new rights,252 it was 
influenced by sui generis and intercommunal level of Indigenous 
legality and may protect sui generis and intercommunal level 
legalities.253 
Today, the IITC serves as “a voice and advocate for the 
human rights of Indigenous Peoples.”254 In that capacity, it 
called upon U.N. human rights institutions to attend to the 
DAPL’s dispossession of the Sioux Tribe.255 In doing so, the 
IITC cited self-determination and FPIC, international law on 
treaties, a lack of domestic remedies, and other alleged harms.256 
The IITC is not the only inter-Indian or inter-Indigenous legal 
group. There is the International Work Group for Indigenous 
Affairs, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Indian Law 
Resource Center, Native American Rights Fund, National 
Congress of American Indians, and others.257 Intercommunal 
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Indigenous networks have supported the Sioux from as far away 
as the Philippines, Australia, and Norway.258 
While this might initially appear to be a way of 
disseminating information and garnering support, it has material 
effects. For instance, the Sami peoples of Norway have engaged 
legal representation to pressure Norway’s Government Pension 
Fund and Norway’s largest financial services group, DNB, to 
divest from companies involved in the DAPL.259 That is an 
example of how intercommunal actors use their legal system to 
engage with transnational actors, discussed below, to pressure 
divestment and destabilize the DAPL. 
The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe received support from 
inter-Indigenous networks that work in conjunction with NSAs 
like Cultural Survival and Amnesty International.260 At the 
request of Chairman Archambault, Amnesty International wrote 
a letter to the United States Department of Justice requesting an 
investigation into violations of national, international, and 
human rights law by the local police.261 Amnesty International 
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also wrote letters to the local sheriff’s department to express 
concerns over their use of force.262 Many organizations, like 
Amnesty International, have used social media as a means for 
gathering evidence and collecting information in their effort to 
support the Sioux Tribe.263 
The widespread use and effects of social media by 
intercommunal legal actors has influenced American lawmakers. 
They have influenced cities such as Sacramento, Seattle, and Los 
Angeles, which have passed resolutions backing the Sioux Tribe 
against the DAPL and leading them to divest from banks that 
fund the DAPL.264 Similarly, United States Senator Bernie 
Sanders drew attention to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe in a 
speech, which he then followed with a letter to then-sitting 
President Obama to halt the pipeline.265 The Corps noted the 
increase in attention generated by social media as a complicating 
aspect of the DAPL development.266 
Under a legal problem-solving approach, the Sioux Tribe 
and its intercommunal legal networks have operated FPIC to 
pressure Dakota Access, LLC and the federal government to 
seek its consent and solve this common problem or face greater 
destabilization. In doing so, the Sioux Tribe and its 
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intercommunal networks have invoked FPIC as international 
human rights law. 
D. The International Human Rights Level 
The international level of legality is “the classic sense of 
relations between sovereign states and more broadly relations 
governed, for example, by human rights or refugee law.”267 At 
the international legal level, the Sioux Tribe has invoked treaties 
as well as Indigenous peoples’ rights recognized in the 
international human rights regime, particularly FPIC and self-
determination.268 Indigenous peoples’ ability to work across 
communities, NSAs, inter-Indigenous networks, and 
international bodies have drawn attention to the Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe’s opposition to the DAPL. The Sioux Tribe’s 
invocation of FPIC and self-determination as recognized in 
UNDRIP and supported by intercommunal legalities is evidence 
of the discursive construction of legality at the international 
level.269 Although UNDRIP is the most important international 
instrument for FPIC, there are other influential instruments. 
In 1989, the International Labour Organization 
Convention No. 169 established FPIC in a binding document for 
ratifying governments, which does not include the United 
States.270 Convention No. 169 requires FPIC for relocation 
purposes and requires ratifying countries to consult with 
Indigenous communities regarding development that influences 
them and their traditional lands.271 Other international 
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institutions and instruments have recognized Indigneous 
peoples’ FPIC.272 A prominent example is the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s recommendation that 
states should ensure “that no decisions directly relating to 
[Indigenous peoples’] rights and interests are taken without their 
informed consent.”273 Where previous international instruments, 
such as the Convention No. 169, used the language of self-
determination without naming it as such,274 UNDRIP expressly 
ties FPIC to self-determination through its content and 
conceptual framework.275 Because UNDRIP links Indigenous 
participation to their self-determination, some identify UNDRIP 
as perhaps “the most comprehensive and progressive of 
international instruments dealing with Indigenous peoples’ 
                                                
Lecture at the Castan Centre for Human Rights at Monash University: The 
Participation of Indigenous Peoples in the United Nations System’s Political 
Institutions (May 27, 2004), 
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/speeches/participation-indigenous-
peoples-united-nations-systems-political-institutions 
[https://perma.cc/7DVG-6LWE]; LEENA HEINAMAKI ET AL., ACTUALIZING 
SÁMI RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE RESEARCH 227 (2017) (“[i]n 
1992, the [Earth Summit] in Rio succeeded to shift the role of Indigenous 
peoples from the objects of protection to subjects of co-operation.”). The 
Earth Summit saw the creation of three major agreements and guidelines 
aimed at altering the approaches to development, including Agenda 21, the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and the Statement of 
Forest Principles. Importantly, the conference delegates agreed “not to carry 
out any activities on the lands of indigenous peoples that would cause 
environmental degradation or that would be culturally inappropriate.” FRED 
M SHELLEY, THE WORLD’S POPULATION: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRITICAL 
ISSUES, CRISES, AND EVER-GROWING COUNTRIES 51 (2015). Both Agenda 
21 and the Rio Declaration are not legally binding, but they conceptually 
bound Indigenous identity to environmental conservation. The Convention 
on Biological Diversity, which was opened for signatures at the Earth 
Summit, also contains an FPIC clause. U.N. Convention on Biological 
Diversity art. 8(j), Mar. 8, 1994, 1771 U.N.T.S. 430. 
272 There are many more sources of FPIC contained within the U.N. See, 
e.g., DOYLE & WHITMORE, supra note 226, at 53–87; also American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Organization of American 
States, AG/RES.2888 (XLVI-O/16) (June 15, 2016). Many of those 
instruments are not “binding” international law insturments within the 
United States. 
273 Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. 
Doc. A/53/18; GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 18, ¶ 299 (Sept. 10, 1998). 
274 Claire Charters, Indigenous Peoples and International Law and Policy, 
18 PUB. L. REV. 22, 28 (2007); S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN 
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rights.”276 From a more critical perspective, Karen Engle notes 
that UNDRIP “contains significant compromises. Embedded in 
it are serious limitations to the very rights it is praised for 
containing.”277 
Undoubtedly there are limitations to the UNDRIP, but it 
is worth emphasizing the UNDRIP does not “grant” rights. It 
recognizes that Indigenous peoples have rights and calls upon 
states to recognize them. The call to “recognize” is vague, but 
the flexibility inherent in that vagueness allow Indigenous 
peoples to draw from multiple and overlapping international, 
intercommunal, sui generis, and other legalities that defy 
conventional “top-down control using fixed statutes, detailed 
rules, and judicial enforcement”278 style of state-based legal 
regimes. 
At the international level of legality, the U.N. has created 
the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the Expert 
Mechanisms on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to 
facilitate recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights. All three 
have actively promoted FPIC279 alongside the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.280 The Sioux Tribe, with 
the assistance of NSAs and intercommunal legal actors, such as 
the IITC, has appealed to the U.N. to send human rights 
observers to the protest site.281 
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The current Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, called for a halt to 
the DAPL and later visited with the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 
to investigate in greater detail.282 Tauli-Corpuz wrote, 
[t]he United States should, in accordance with its 
commitment to implement the Declaration on the 
Rights [of] Indigenous Peoples, consult with the 
affected communities in good faith and ensure 
their free, and informed consent prior to the 
approval of a project affecting their lands, 
particularly in connection with extractive 
resource industries.283 
Similarly, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of 
Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai, called for a 
halt to pipeline construction after the protest turned violent.284 At 
the invitation of Chairman Archambault, an expert member of 
the U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Chief Edward 
John, spent three days at the protest site.285 John later wrote a 
letter noting a host of issues and potential breaches of 
international human rights.286 Several NSAs, including the IITC 
and Cultural Survival, supported John’s visitation.287 Following 
John’s visit, the U.N. Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on 
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Indigenous Issues, Alvaro Pop Ac, released a statement 
reiterating concerns over the proposed pipeline route and a lack 
of consultation with the Sioux.288 
None of these U.N. actor’s actions can enforce the United 
States’ compliance through force or sanctions.289 They primarily 
exert pressure, which perhaps, the United States and other states 
shrug off. However, a Member state’s poor record of human 
rights compliance over time may signal to industry actors that 
development projects, such as the DAPL, are riskier than they 
appear. The intercommunal actors created FPIC as partially 
based on and to ptorect on their sui generis legal systems and 
have pressured international legal actors to adopt it.290 The 
international level has been discursively constructed and adopted 
FPIC in connection with the regional and transnational levels.291 
E. The Regional Level of Legality 
Examples of the regional level of legality are, according 
to Twining, the European Union, the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and the Organization of African Unity.292 The 
regional level includes the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights, which has developed a jurisprudence for Indigenous 
rights that includes FPIC.293 A commission and a court constitute 
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the Inter-American System and both have articulated a 
requirement for governments to obtain Indigenous peoples’ 
consent.294 Anaya and Williams argue that these developments 
show how a court may interprete Indigenous peoples rights, 
perhaps such as FPIC, as a legal entitlement and are indicative 
of regional customary law.295 In Awas Tingni, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights ordered the State to demarcate 
and title Indigenous territory to ensure that no acts on the part of 
the State or private parties would affect Awas Tingni enjoyment 
of its territories.296 The subsequent case law Awas Tingni builds 
upon this ruling and goes so far as to describe states’ duty to 
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obtain FPIC in some situations.297 As a regional body, the Inter-
American System does not exercise global jurisdiction. 
However, it is sufficient to note that regional bodies, like the 
Inter-American System, recognize FPIC as a legal right and 
tribes, like the Sioux Tribe, are now using it. 
In December 2016, the Standing Rock Sioux, along with 
the Cheyenne River Sioux and Yankton Sioux Tribes, 
announced they had requested that the Inter-American 
Commission investigate Dakota Access, LLC and the federal 
government for failure to consult.298 On December 9, 2016, the 
Standing Rock Sioux testified at the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights.299 The jurisprudential trend of 
the Inter-American system suggests that the Sioux will find a 
friendly Commission. However, the court is unlikely to weigh in 
because the federal government has asserted that both the 
Commission and the Court lack jurisdiction over United States 
matters. 
Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States evinces the 
federal government’s stance toward the commission.300 
Members of the Western Shoshone complained to the 
commission that the federal government allowed and facilitated 
mining developments on their land without their consultation.301 
The Commission found the federal government violated the 
Danns’ property rights and required United States courts to 
consider their individual and collective rights and informed 
participation.302 In response, the federal government asserted a 
                                                
297 See, e.g., Kichiwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, supra note 
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lack of jurisdiction.303 The Sioux Tribe will find a Commission 
with a jurisprudence that supports Indigenous peoples’ FPIC, but 
the federal government will likely again adopt the stance it did 
toward the Dann case. The Commission’s finding for the Sioux 
Tribe may, however, lend support and pressure for its struggle. 
Many of the multiple and overlapping levels of legality 
work together to pressure Dakota Access, LLC and the federal 
government. But without an enforcement mechanism or some 
way to convert that pressure into a force that Dakota Access, 
LLC and the federal government care about, then all that 
pressure may be for naught. A surprising and unlikely place to 
find a degree of enforcement resides within the transnational 
level of legality. 
F. The Transnational Level of Legality 
The transnational level of legality includes “transnational 
arbitration, a putative lex mercatoria, Internet law, and more 
controversially, the internal governance of multinational 
corporations . . . or institutions of organized crime.”304 Although 
Twining views the internal governance of multinational 
corporations as controversial, Fleur Johns has argued that “the 
corporation has long been a feature of international legal practice 
and argument, [but] it is nonetheless one upon which public 
international lawyers have tended to look askance.”305 The rules 
corporations adopt for themselves are an unlikely place for an 
enforcement mechanism, but to the extent those rules shape 
corporate and state behaviors, they also shape international and 
transnational practice. The Sioux Tribe and its network’s ability 
to publish and disperse information on corporate internal 
governance mechanisms attempts to hold corporations 
accountable to own their standards or face divestment. 
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1. The Applicable Transnational Legality 
While human rights standards at the international and 
regional levels address the obligations and aspirations of states, 
which the federal government may reject as not legally 
obligatory, the transnational level initially appears even more 
unlikely to restrict action. As well noted by John Ruggie, the 
transnational corporate level suffers from a “gap in governance” 
that leaves corporations unregulated.306 In response to the 
identification of the transnational governance gap, the U.N. 
Security-Generals appointed Ruggie as the Special 
Representative for Business and Human Rights. In that role, 
Ruggie developed the “Protect, Respect, Remedy” 
framework.307 It clarifies that states are required to protect 
human rights through legislative action, while corporations are 
required to respect human rights. Certainly, “respect” generates 
little authority for strict legalists who consider top-down legal 
styles as the sole standard for legality. 
However, the U.N. General Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (UNGPs) promulgate a standard that requires 
corporations and other NSAs to respect recognized human rights 
even where the host government does not.308 The UNGPs do not 
directly reference FPIC or the UNDRIP but note that 
“enterprises should respect the human rights of individuals 
belonging to specific groups or populations that require 
particular attention . . . In this connection, United Nations 
instruments have elaborated further on the rights of indigenous 
peoples[.]”309 The UNGP’s direction that corporations should 
consider “U.N. instruments . . . on the rights of indigenous 
peoples,” is consistent with the former Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples James Anaya’s view that 
businesses must respect Indigenous rights contained in UNDRIP 
                                                
306 John Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary General, Protect, 
Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶ 3, 
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309 Id. at 14. 
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like FPIC.310 If U.N. bodies say that states need to obtain 
Indigenous peoples’ FPIC and corporations must respect 
recognized human rights, a consequence is that corporations also 
need to respect Indigenous peoples’ FPIC. Admittedly, “respect” 
remains a vague legal standard. Where corporations fail to 
respect Indigenous FPIC, potentially injured tribes can use 
FPIC’s definitional vagueness and its softness to generate 
resistance by naming, blaming and by encouraging destabilizing 
acts.311 
Alongside the creation of the UNGPs, multilateral 
lending institutions and corporations sought to become part of 
the human rights discourse by articulating and adopting 
standards for Indigenous participation in development projects, 
including FPIC. A noncomprehensive list includes: 
• The World Bank Environmental and Social 
Framework from August 2016 applies to 
borrowing countries;312 
• The International Council on Mining and 
Minerals (ICMM) 2013 Indigenous Peoples 
and Mining Position Statement is a voluntary 
initiative for the mining industry;313 
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• The International Finance Corporation’s 
2012 Performance Standard 7 on Indigenous 
Peoples for private borrowers;314 and 
• The Equator Principles III has adopted the 
language for the International Finance 
Corporation’s (IFC) Performance Standard 
for lenders or financiers of extractive industry 
projects.315  
When corporations adopt voluntary initiatives, like the ICMM, 
or are required to comply with lender/financier restrictions, like 
the Equator Principles III (EP III), they commit to higher 
participatory standards for Indigenous peoples where their 
actions will affect Indigenous peoples. These voluntary 
standards are “nonlegal” in the sense that state courts cannot 
enforce these standards against those who sign up for them but 
do not comply.316 Nevertheless, within a global space, they can 
be powerful.317 Importantly, these initiatives provide Indigenous 
peoples with a means for partially circumventing strictly 
positivistic national legal systems to articulate and solve 
problems, which Ruggie seems to approve.318 Despite states’ 
hesitancy to embrace or recognize Indigenous rights as a distinct 
category of legal protections, corporations and IFIs are 
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increasingly pressured to respect Indigenous rights as a category 
of human rights protections.319 Where corporations commit 
themselves to higher standards for Indigenous peoples’ 
participation but do not adhere to those standards, they may face 
destabilizing acts from different levels of legality.320 
2. Destabilizing Tactics 
The Sioux Tribe is combining tactics to destabilize the 
DAPL. First, as discussed above, they delay the project by 
engaging with national legal processes.321 And, second, as 
evaluated here, they problematize funding by pressuring IFIs to 
divest from the project or face divestment from the Sioux Tribe’s 
supporters. 
Rachel Davis and Daniel Franks argue that one of the 
major issues facing extractive industry projects today is delays 
resulting from inadequate consultation and a failure to obtain a 
social license to operate.322 Delay may result from various 
actions such as lawsuits, project modifications, lost productivity, 
theft, roadblocks, reputational costs, or fines.323 They estimate 
that delayed extractive industry projects valued at $3–5 billion 
dollars lose nearly $20 million in revenue each week.324 Energy 
Transfer Partners, the principal shareholder of Dakota Access, 
LLC, values the DAPL delay costs at $3.8 billion.325  
In November 2016, Dakota Access, LLC requested an 
expedited ruling on its motion for summary judgment and, in 
support, claimed that it was suffering irreparable “harm alone 
[which] is $83.3 million per month of delay (or $2.7 million per 
day).”326 In a hearing, Judge Boasberg denied Dakota Access, 
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LLC’s motion.327 Media outlets then reported that Dakota 
Access had lost over $450 million due to delays.328 
The Sioux Tribe’s multiple rounds of litigation 
successfully delayed the project. Although currently operational, 
the ability to temporarily increase production costs by seeking 
further legal review may make continued operation of the DAPL 
or future natural resource development projects less attractive to 
investors where FPIC is not obtained. When the Sioux Tribe’s 
ability to use the United States legal system to delay is combined 
with its ability to use pressure to encourage divestment from the 
DAPL, the project, as well as future fossil fuel projects, may 
become fatally destabilized. 
The Sioux’s divestment tactics may work because many of 
the DAPL’s IFIs have adopted lending restrictions, such as EP 
III,329 which explicitly requires an FPIC standard for projects like 
the DAPL. Of the thirty-five IFIs that have invested in or lent to 
the DAPL,330 twenty-three have adopted EP III.331 The EP III 
expressly referenced Ruggie’s principle of “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” and mandates FPIC according to the IFC’s 
Performance Standards.332 As long as the twenty-three IFIs that 
have adopted EP III comply, the IFIs are required to take several 
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steps. The IFIs must publicly report that the DAPL has failed to 
seek or achieve FPIC, establish a grievance mechanism, and 
engage an independent environmental and social consultant to 
carry out an independent review of the project.333 These processes 
are costly and make lending to the DAPL developers less desirable. 
There are two problems with voluntary initiatives, like EP 
III. First, voluntary initiatives were created for industry self-
regulation.334 Even if the Sioux Tribe and its partners are 
publishing information on the lenders while mobilizing public 
support to divest, these tactics depend on IFIs divesting or having 
supporters divest from those IFIs. Publishing internal governance 
regulations may be a means for publicly enforcing private, self-
regulating voluntary initiatives to hold transnational actors 
accountable. It remains possible that even if there is pressure to 
divest, people simply do not. 
Second, voluntary initiatives, like EP III, tend not to apply 
in the United States because it is treated as a “designated country,” 
a country “deemed to have robust environmental and social 
governance, legislation system and institutional capacity designed 
to protect their people and the natural environment.”335 Even if the 
United States is a “designated country” that appears to have 
“robust” legal protections, the Sioux Tribe and its partners’ 
opposition to the DAPL has successfully highlighted the 
deficiencies of state-level legal protections. For instance, in May 
2017, ten banks that had invested in the DAPL and had signed onto 
the EP III wrote to the Equator Principles Association.336 They 
expressed concern that “(i) local laws in relation to engagement 
with indigenous communities are lacking compared to best 
practice for FPIC . . . and (ii) banks had no leverage as there was 
no breach with the applicable environmental & [sic] social 
standards being used.”337 The letter continued, “[i]n addition to the 
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reputation damage that this has caused to the banks involved, we 
believe that this is likely to damage the reputation of the Equator 
Principles (EPs) as a ‘golden standard’ and a common playing field 
for determining, assessing and managing environmental and social 
risks in projects.”338 This letter might suggest that the EPs are 
ineffective regulations for an unaccountable industry. On the other 
hand, the letter demonstrates the Sioux Tribe’s effectiveness. The 
letter further requested EP standards to apply to projects in 
designated countries and create a working group to generate 
proposals on how to facilitate resolution where there has been a 
breach of the EPs.339 
In mounting their opposition to the DAPL, the Sioux Tribe 
has exposed the inadequate state-level legal protections of 
supposed designated countries by forcing EPs and other similar 
voluntary initiatives into a crisis: they must take seriously 
Indigenous peoples’ consent or admit the “golden standards” are 
little more than greenwashing. Either way, the Sioux Tribe and its 
networks will not relent. The Sioux’s networks of Indigenous and 
environmental activists continue publicizing information on who 
has invested and how individuals can pressure those institutions to 
divest.340 
The networks have created websites to track which banks 
have invested341 and how much has been purposefully divested.342 
The Norwegian public and the Sami peoples pressured DNB of 
Norway to divest.343 DNB originally engaged an independent 
human rights investigator to develop recommendations as to 
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whether it should divest.344 It then sold its ownership interest in 
the companies that were building the DAPL.345 Investors such as 
BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, and Société Générale have 
previously divested from natural resource projects that faced 
social resistance.346 The Sioux Tribe and anti-DAPL networks 
are doing the same and have publicly called to meet with the 
IFIs.347 The most dramatic implementation thus far has been the 
Seattle City Council’s divestment of $3 billion from Wells Fargo 
for supporting the DAPL.348 
If one looks at any singular event, such as the Sioux 
Tribe’s opposition to the DAPL, it might appear as though 
individual tribes are continuing to lose their fights against large 
natural resource development. Under a broader view, the Sioux 
Tribe’s tactics are consistent with tactics Indigenous peoples are 
using around the globe.349 At a global level, the Sioux Tribe has 
mobilized delay and divestment tactics in a way that suggests the 
formalization of networks and connections between tribes, 
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environmental groups, and anti–fossil fuel activists. The ability 
of the Sioux Tribe and others to delay development while 
pushing for divestment may, in the end, stand as a significant 
threat to potential developments and investors—even in 
designated countries—where Indigenous consent and 
consultation is not sought. If these tactics continue, the cost of 
pursuing fossil fuel development may increase to the point where 
it is no longer economically viable. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Sioux Tribe’s operation and invocation of FPIC is an 
important development that should be understood according to 
the legal problem approach in global spaces. The Sioux Tribe’s 
activism against the DAPL is broader than a state-based legal 
challenge. Its invocation of FPIC and self-determination is not 
merely an international human rights claim. The point of 
contestation appears to be whether a pipeline can be built 
through a relatively small piece of territory. However, in 
opposing the DAPL crossing that territory, the Tribe has 
interjected alternative legal levels that are overlaid by historical 
and global struggles. It has invoked FPIC as a concept and begun 
operating it as law in a global space, one that has multiple and 
overlapping sui generis, intercommunal, international, regional, 
and transnational legalities. 
State actors are confined by jurisdictional mandates: the 
Corps is constrained by what it can consider in the same way that 
District Court Judges are constrained by what they can consider. 
Industry actors often consider the state legal regime as the 
preeminent source of law, which in many cases has been a sound 
practice. That practice is becoming increasingly risky. Some 
human rights advocates and Indigenous peoples believe that 
states should recognize Indigenous peoples’ FPIC. If that were 
to happen, state judges might treat FPIC as a feature of domestic 
law just as Judge Boasberg dealt with the Treaty rights the Sioux 
Tribe claimed.350 Judges, as restricted by state law, may then fail 
to consider tribal “existential” concerns,351 while further 
subjecting them to the State. 
The Sioux Tribe’s activism demonstrates the operation 
of FPIC according to the problem-solving approach. The Tribe 
must engage with state legality, and it can use that legality to 
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delay the project. Simultaneously, it can engage with industry 
actors by directly impacting development funding. In doing so, 
the Sioux Tribe has highlighted that Indigenous peoples have 
global reach and can impact designated countries just as much as 
developing countries. It may be that Indigenous peoples are 
translating their knowledge into norms that operate according to 
a nonstate-centric model of legality, a global practice that will 
guide behavior and effectively resolve disputes by taking their 
“existential” concerns seriously.352 
This article has clarified how the Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe is operating FPIC through multiple and overlapping levels 
of legality and mounting pressure upon IFIs at the transnational 
level. The Standing Rock Sioux and other Indigenous 
communities have created and begun engaging in sophisticated 
multilevel legal approaches that may mitigate the pernicious 
effects of state law. The Sioux Tribe has engaged in litigation at 
the state-level legal processes, but they have also become 
sophisticated tacticians at other legal levels, which might not be 
visible to attorneys who are primarily concerned with state law. 
The Sioux are using the multiple extranational levels to pressure 
both industry and the federal government. State and industry 
actors may continue to ignore Indigenous peoples and their 
unique histories, and may fail to understand how FPIC is 
operating throughout the extranational levels. However, the 
forces of law are changing and, in no small measure, it is 
changing because of peoples like the Oceti Sakowin. 
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